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Toward Coherent Federal
Oversight of Medicine

PATRICIA J. ZETTLER*

ABSTRACT
The conventional wisdom in U.S. health law and policy holds that states
regulate medical practice—the activities of physicians and other health
care professionals—while the federal government regulates medical
products. But relying on states as the principal regulators of medical
practice has, at times, driven law and policy in directions that are problematic
from a public health perspective, as demonstrated by a deadly 2012
outbreak of fungal meningitis that was linked to a primarily stateregulated practice known as drug compounding. This Article argues that
the federalism concerns underlying the conventional wisdom are misplaced.
It demonstrates that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the federal
government is deeply entangled in regulating medical practice, and such
federal regulation is lawful. After examining the goals of federalism
within the context of medicine, this Article proposes an alternate paradigm
for guiding decisions about when the federal government should be
involved in overseeing medicine: Congress and administrative agencies
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should exert federal authority when medical practice contributes to a
national public health problem that states cannot address. This framework
is applied to one pressing public health problem to which medical practice
contributes—antibiotic resistance—to show how the framework could be
implemented. Federal oversight of medical practice under this framework
would be more principled and transparent than the scheme of federal
control that is in place today.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2012, an outbreak of fungal meningitis sickened 751 and
killed 64 people in the United States.1 The outbreak was traced to tainted
steroid injections made by the New England Compounding Center, a
pharmacy in Massachusetts.2 The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) concluded that the tainted drugs reached approximately
14,000 patients in 23 states, which, combined with the number of fatalities
and sickened patients, made this outbreak one of the worst U.S. public
health disasters in recent history.3
In the Congressional hearings that followed, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) was criticized for failing to prevent this outbreak.4
Yet the FDA’s authority to prevent the outbreak was unclear because the
tainted drugs were made through a practice known as “drug compounding,”5
rather than through traditional drug manufacturing.6 That is, the FDA

1.

See Multi-State Outbreak of Fungal Meningitis and Other Infections, CENTERS
(Oct. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Multi-State Outbreak],
http://www.cdc.gov/hai/outbreaks/meningitis.html [http://perma.cc/4SUD-6YSM].
2. See id.
3. See Pharmacy Compounding: Implications of the 2012 Meningitis Outbreak:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 112th Cong. 1–
4 (2012) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin, Chairman, S. Comm. on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions) [hereinafter 2012 HELP Compounding Hearing], available at
http://www.help.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=5f5def0d-5056-a032-5297-eab57634d209
[http://perma.cc/9KQF-9AQ3]; Multi-State Outbreak, supra note 1. In fact, in 2014, the
owners of the New England Compounding Center were arrested and indicted on 131
counts, including charges of racketeering, mail fraud, conspiracy, and second-degree
murder. See Jess Bidgood & Sabrina Tavernise, Pharmacy Executives Face Murder
Charges in Meningitis Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2014, at A23.
4. See, e.g., Rob Stein, Lawmakers Clash with FDA over Meningitis Outbreak,
NPR.ORG (Nov. 14, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/11/14/165
156555/congressmen-clash-with-fda-over-meningitis-outbreak [http://perma.cc/N2PK-PYE5].
5. Drug compounding involves a medical practitioner combining, mixing, or
altering drug ingredients to create an individualized medication for a patient. See 2012
HELP Compounding Hearing, supra note 3 (testimony of Margaret A. Hamburg,
Commissioner, Food & Drug Admin.); Kevin Outterson, Regulating Compounding
Pharmacies after NECC, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1969, 1971 (2012).
6. See 2012 HELP Compounding Hearing, supra note 3. Before 1992 the FDA
generally declined to regulate drug compounding. In 1992, concerned about the risks of
large-scale compounding, the FDA announced a policy describing when it considered
compounding to be within its purview. Among the activities the FDA identified as
triggering regulation was advertising compounding services. In 1997, Congress added
section 503A to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to codify the FDA’s 1992
policy. In 2002, the Supreme Court invalidated the advertising provisions of section 503A
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
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lacked clear authority because the contaminated drugs were made by a
pharmacy, an activity that falls within the “practice of medicine”7
traditionally regulated by state law, rather than by a federally regulated
drug manufacturer.
This division of labor between the states and the federal government
will be unsurprising to those familiar with U.S. health law and policy.
Arising in part from courts’ longstanding recognition that the states are
authorized to regulate medical practice pursuant to their police powers,8
the conventional wisdom among courts, lawmakers, and administrative
agencies is that states regulate medical practice, while the federal
government regulates medical products. For example, in United States v.
Evers, the Fifth Circuit explained that, while the FDA “was obviously
intended to control the availability of drugs for prescribing by
physicians,” it “was not intended to regulate the practice of medicine.”9
Similarly, in United States v. Regenerative Sciences, LLC, Judge Rosemary
M. Collyer of the D.C. District Court noted that the “Defendants state[d]
that Congress has left the practice of medicine to the States to regulate,
[and] FDA does not disagree with these principles.”10
The discourse following the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak demonstrated
the endurance of these ideas. Despite the public health stakes illustrated
by the outbreak, members of Congress continued to express concern about
intruding on state regulation of medical practice when designing the Drug
Quality and Security Act of 2013, which was enacted in part to remedy
the FDA’s limited authority over compounding pharmacies.11 Senator
in a decision that left the validity of the rest of section 503A in question. See Thompson
v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 377 (2002). At the time of the 2012 fungal meningitis
outbreak, there was a circuit split regarding the severability of the unconstitutional
advertising provisions of section 503A, and consequently, the extent of the FDA’s authority
over compounding was quite unclear. See Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383,
387 (5th Cir. 2008); W. States Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 238 F.3d 1090, 1096–98 (9th Cir.
2001); Outterson, supra note 5, at 1969–71.
7. This Article uses the phrase “practice of medicine” broadly to include the
practice of pharmacy, the practice of dentistry, and other health-related practices that states
traditionally regulated. Thus, medical practitioners in this Article include physicians,
dentists, pharmacists, and other professionals authorized to independently practice medicine.
8. See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122–23, 128 (1889).
9. 643 F.2d 1043, 1048 (5th Cir. 1981).
10. 878 F. Supp. 2d 248, 255 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 741 F.3d 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2014);
see also Richard Epstein, The FDA’s Misguided Regulation of Stem-Cell Procedures: How
Administrative Overreach Blocks Medical Innovation, LEGAL POL’Y REP., Sept. 2013, at
2, available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/lpr_17.pdf [http://perma.cc/8245EERC] (describing the regulation of medical practice as distinct from the FDA’s regulation
of drugs and biologics).
11. Title I of the Drug Quality and Security Act addresses drug compounding, while
Title II is intended to improve the security of the drug supply chain. See Drug Quality and
Security Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-54, 127 Stat. 587 (2013).
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Tom Coburn, speaking in support of the new law, emphasized that it
properly left practice-of-medicine issues to the states “so the art and science
of medicine would not be impeded by FDA.”12 Additionally, the new law
left some significant holes in federal authority, such as making federal
licensing for large-scale compounding pharmacies optional rather than
mandatory.13 It appears that Congress made licensing optional because it
could not agree on what constitutes traditional compounding, which would
be left to state regulation, versus drug manufacturing, which would be
subject to federal requirements.14 In other words, Congress could not
agree on where to draw the line between the practice of medicine and the
manufacturing of a drug product. The gaps in federal authority resulting
from this impasse may leave the United States at risk for another public
health disaster.15
Although concerns about federal interference with the practice of
medicine often arise in the FDA context, the FDA’s jurisdiction is but one
area among many in health law and policy that have been affected by these
concerns. Concerns about federal control of medical practice—including
legal concerns about the limits of the federal government’s constitutional
and statutory authority over medicine, as well as policy concerns about
the wisdom of federal control—have played a role in shaping healthcare
reform,16 controlled substances policy,17 Medicare,18 and the oversight of
medical practitioners’ business practices,19 among other things. Likewise,
federal agencies other than the FDA, including the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services,20 the Drug Enforcement Administration,21 and the

12. 159 CONG. REC. S8029-06 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2013) (statement of Sen. Coburn).
13. See Drug Quality and Security Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-54, § 102, 127
Stat. 587, 592–93 (2013); Kevin Outterson, The Drug Quality and Security Act—Mind the
Gaps, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 97, 98 (2014) [hereinafter Outterson, DQSA].
14. See Outterson, DQSA, supra note 13, at 98.
15. Cf. id (“[If] another tragedy similar to the one involving the NECC is to be
avoided, additional action [beyond the Drug Quality and Security Act] is needed.”).
16. See infra notes 76–82, 86–88 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 54, 171–73 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 78, 85 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Coll. of Am. Pathologists v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 859, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
21. See, e.g., Jane C. Ballantyne, Regulation of Opioid Prescribing: Over-Regulation
Compromises Doctors’ Ability to Treat Pain, 334 BRIT. MED. J. 811, 811–12 (2007).
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Federal Trade Commission,22 have been criticized on both legal and
policy grounds for exerting authority over medical practice.
But these federalism concerns over the practice of medicine are
misplaced. State regulation arose at a time when the practice of medicine
was largely unregulated and quite provincial—medicine was dominated by
unlicensed solo practitioners who treated patients with self-made remedies,
local differences in practice standards were to be expected, and courts
viewed the federal government’s commerce powers as quite limited.23
While the traditional view that the federal government should not regulate
medical practice may have been reasonable in those circumstances, this
view does not account for advances in technology and scientific understanding
that have changed medicine into a national field with a recognized impact
on the national public health. Moreover, the traditional view fails to
acknowledge the ways in which the federal government currently does
control medical practice, as well as the porousness of the practice-products
distinction. Consequently, determining whether an activity constitutes medical
practice is not a useful way to decide whether the states or the federal
government should regulate that particular activity.
Instead, when deciding whether to exert federal authority, Congress and
federal administrative agencies should consider whether the activity
causes or contributes to a national public health problem that states cannot
address. This framework proposes a role for the federal government in
regulating medical practice that is both broader and narrower than the role
that the federal government currently plays. While other scholars have
embraced the idea that the federal government should regulate particular
aspects of medical practice,24 or explicitly argued that the federal government
has the constitutional authority to regulate medical practice,25 this Article
considers the goals of federalism in the context of medicine and proposes

22. See, e.g., Brief of the American Dental Ass’n, American Medical Ass’n, et al.,
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135
S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (No. 13–534) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of the American Dental Ass’n
et al.].
23. See generally JAMES C. MOHR, LICENSED TO PRACTICE: THE SUPREME COURT
DEFINES THE AMERICAN MEDICAL PROFESSION (2013).
24. See, e.g., Yaniv Heled, The Regulation of Genetic Aspects of Donated Reproductive
Tissue–The Need for Federal Regulation, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 243
(2010); Jaime S. King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation
Genetic Screening, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 283, 331 (2008); William M.
Sage & David A. Hyman, Combating Antimicrobial Resistance: Regulatory Strategies and
Institutional Capacity, 84 TUL. L. REV. 781, 823–24 (2010); Michael S. Young & Rachel
K. Alexander, Recognizing the Nature of American Medical Practice: An Argument for
Adopting Federal Medical Licensure, 13 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 145, 166–67 (2010).
25. See Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the
Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 161 (2004).
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a general framework for determining when federal regulation of medical
practice is warranted. Implementing the proposed framework could open
new options for federal legal interventions to address serious public health
problems.
Part II of this Article traces the history of the conventional wisdom that
the states govern medical practice, and describes how the states have
carried out medical practice regulation. Part III argues that, contrary to
the conventional wisdom, the federal government is deeply entangled in
regulating medical practice. This regulation is both direct, as with the
Controlled Substances Act’s rules about prescribing drugs of abuse,26 and
indirect, as with Medicare coverage decisions27 and even certain patents.28
Additionally, Part III demonstrates that there is nothing unlawful about
such examples of federal oversight of medical practice—the Constitution
permits the federal government to regulate most, if not all, medical
practice. Part III also offers an explanation for why these instances of
federal regulation have been accepted despite the maxim that states are
the primary regulators of medical practice, and suggests that the current
approach to federal oversight is opaque and inconsistent, which drives law
and policy in directions that are problematic at times. Given that the federal
government currently exerts, or fails to exert, its authority over medicine
in ways that are problematic in some circumstances, the question then, is
in what circumstances should the federal government intervene?
Part IV answers that question by considering the goals of federalism.
Because federal control of medicine has its own potential drawbacks and
states may be better positioned to regulate some aspects of medical
practice, Part IV argues that the federal government should oversee only
those aspects of medical practice that cause or contribute to national
public health problems that the states cannot address. Depending on the
problem to be addressed, this federal oversight might include direct
requirements that expressly restrict the behaviors of practitioners and may
preempt state oversight, or indirect forms of regulation, such as conditions
on federal funds given to medical practitioners or state governments. Part
IV also suggests that abandoning the conventional wisdom would open
new avenues for addressing serious public health crises, such as the problem

26.
27.
28.

See infra notes 160–70 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 214–31 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 277–83 and accompanying text.
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of drug-resistant bacteria, through federal legal action, and examines how the
framework proposed in this Article could be implemented.
Because medical practice has a profound impact on the health and
economy of the United States, effectively regulating it presents important
and challenging legal and policy questions. This Article helps to address
those questions by proposing an implementable framework that incorporates
both the goal of protecting the public health and the goal of preserving the
benefits of a federalist system of government. While this framework
presents potential line-drawing problems because it may be difficult to
determine what is a national public health problem that states cannot address,
it nevertheless improves on the conventional wisdom by counseling lawmakers
and federal administrative agencies to exert federal authority over medical
practice in a principled and transparent manner.
II. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: FEDERALISM AND THE
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
The states, rather than the federal government, have a long history of
regulating the practice of medicine. The earliest American laws
controlling the practice of medicine were enacted by the colonies,29 and
the modern era of medical practice regulation began in 1873, when Texas
established county medical boards to license practitioners.30 The states
continue to actively regulate medical practice. To assess the balance
between federal and state power over the practice of medicine, it is useful
29. See ROBERT C. DERBYSHIRE, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE IN THE UNITED
STATES 1–7 (1969).
30. See id. at 7; Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care:
Regulation, Management, or the Market?, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 825, 828 (1995); Henry E.
Sigerist, The History of Medical Licensure, 104 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1057, 1060 (1934).
Although physician licensure first appeared in the seventeenth century, those earlier
licensure policies were “guild-like” and largely abandoned by 1850. Jost, supra, at 828.
Texas’s licensing law established the first modern medical boards by requiring counties to
appoint boards “to be composed of not less than three practicing physicians of known
ability, and graduates of some medical college, recognized by the American Medical
Association.” Under the law, no person was permitted to practice medicine in Texas
unless that person had received “the degree of ‘doctor of medicine’” from a “regularly
established and well accredited medical college,” or “a certificate of qualification from
some authorized board of medical examiners.” GEORGE W. PASCHAL, A DIGEST OF THE
LAWS OF TEXAS: CONTAINING THE LAWS IN FORCE AND THE REPEALED LAWS ON WHICH
RIGHTS REST FROM 1754 TO 1875 1478f–1478g (4th ed. 2012). The legislative history does
not provide much insight into why the Texas legislature enacted this law. See S. JOURNAL,
13th Leg., 805–807 (Tex. 1873). It may simply have been a sign of the times. In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century the medical profession was becoming more
organized and standardized, and at least certain factions of the profession were lobbying
for licensing. See, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 79–145 (1982); MOHR, supra note 23, at 15.
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to consider the history of state regulation and how states implement medical
practice regulation.
A. Defining the Practice of Medicine
As a preliminary matter, it is helpful to understand what the term
“practice of medicine” encompasses. Definitions have changed over time,
and varied across stakeholders and jurisdictions. For example, a 1908
article in the Journal of the American Medical Association defined the
practice of medicine simply as the “art of healing,”31 and a 1904 article in
the California State Journal of Medicine argued that an individual practices
medicine when the “relations of the parties [a]re those of physician and
patient.”32 But some state courts at the time did not consider an individual
to be practicing medicine unless he administered drugs or performed
surgery.33
Modern legal definitions of the practice of medicine come from state
statutes and courts, and what constitutes the practice of medicine often
differs between states.34 As an example, an Arizona statute defines the
practice of medicine as “the diagnosis, the treatment or the correction
of . . . any and all human diseases, injuries, ailments, infirmities, deformities,
physical or mental, real or imaginary, by any means, methods, devices or
instrumentalities . . . . ”35 An Oregon statute similarly provides that
diagnosing, curing, or treating any mental or physical disease is practicing
medicine, but also specifically includes in its definition advertising that
one is authorized to practice medicine, referring to oneself as a doctor,
prescribing drugs, and performing surgery.36 Courts in different states

31. Editorial, What Constitutes the Practice of Medicine?, 50 JAMA 368, 368
(1908).
32. William C. Tait, The Legal Definition of the Practice of Medicine, 2 CAL. ST. J.
MED. 119, 119 (1904).
33. See, e.g., Smith v. Lane, 31 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (24 Hun) 632, 634–35 (1881); see
also Nelson v. State Bd. of Health, 157 S.W. 501, 505 (Ky. 1900) (holding that an
osteopath is not required to be licensed because he does not “prescribe or administer
medicine or perform surgery”); State v. Liffring, 55 N.E. 168, 168–69 (Ohio 1899)
(concluding that a treatment is not medical practice unless it includes the administration
of drugs); State v. Mylod, 40 A. 753, 755–56 (R.I. 1898) (noting that the practice of
medicine “requires a knowledge of drugs”).
34. See, e.g., Cynthia Marietta & Amy L. McGuire, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Testing: Is It the Practice of Medicine?, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 369, 371 (2009).
35. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1401 (2008).
36. OR. REV. STAT. § 677.085 (2013).
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have sometimes reached divergent conclusions about whether the same
activities constitute medical practice, perhaps understandably given differences
in the underlying statutory language. For instance, a federal court in
California concluded that reviewing a claim for an insurance company did
not constitute the practice of medicine,37 while the Arizona Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that such activities
were subject to the state medical boards’ jurisdiction.38 Also, although
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that a physician’s
testimony as a non-treating expert witness fell within the practice of medicine,39
the Missouri Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion.40
Contemporary scholars have also diverged on whether particular activities
constitute medical practice. For example, whereas some scholars have
argued that legal injection is not a medical procedure because of its nontherapeutic goal,41 others have argued that death row inmates are akin to
terminally ill patients and “deserve to be treated as such.”42
Despite these differences, most state statutes and courts currently define
the practice of medicine as involving at least two activities: (1) diagnosing
a disease, condition, or injury; and (2) prescribing, administering, or
providing a treatment for that disease, condition, or injury.43 To perform
these activities most effectively and provide the highest quality medical
care, practitioners generally assert that they need the flexibility to judge
what is best for a particular patient.44 For example, practitioners’ freedom
to prescribe an FDA-approved drug “off-label”—that is, for a condition
or patient population, or at a dose, not approved by the FDA45—can

37. See Jakway v. Unum Provident Corp., No. CV01-6753AHM(RZX), 2002 WL
31996043, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2002).
38. See State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Fallon, 41 S.W.3d 474,
478–49 (Mo. 2001); Murphy v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 949 P.2d 530, 536 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1997).
39. See Joseph v. D.C. Bd. of Med., 587 A.2d 1085, 1091 (D.C. 1991).
40. See Missouri Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Levine, 808 S.W.2d
440, 443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
41. See, e.g., Robert D. Truog et al., Physicians, Medical Ethics, and Execution by
Lethal Injection, 311 JAMA 2375, 2375 (2014).
42. Kenneth Baum, “To Comfort Always”: Physician Participation in Executions,
5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 61 (2001).
43. See, e.g., Marietta & McGuire, supra note 34, at 371; Noah, supra note 25, at
162.
44. See, e.g., ELIOT FRIEDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE
SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE 384–92 (2d ed. 1988).
45. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for
Heightened Professional and Government Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 476, 476
(2009). When the FDA approves a drug or device, it approves that product as safe and
effective for a particular use—namely, to treat a particular disease or condition, in a
particular patient population. The uses for which the FDA has approved a product are
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benefit a patient by allowing practitioners to incorporate into their practice
emerging evidence that may not be sufficient for FDA approval or may
not have been presented to the FDA for approval, which provides the
patient with additional treatment options.46 Arguments in the United States
against government—rather than practitioner—control of medical practice
have long included assertions that government limits on practitioner
discretion will decrease the quality of medical care.47 Consistent with the
idea that good medical practice is individualized, ethical guidelines
counsel practitioners to promote an individual patient’s best interests and
respect each patient’s autonomy.48 This focus on the health and best
interests of the individual distinguishes medicine from public health,
which is concerned with the well-being of an entire population.49 As
Jeffrey M. Drazen, a physician and editor-in-chief of the New England
Journal of Medicine, wrote, the practice of medicine is carried out “on an
individual basis, with the best interests of the patient foremost in the
practitioner’s mind.”50

listed on its FDA-approved label, and thus, using a product for an indication that is not
FDA-approved, is known as an “off-label” use. See id.
46. See, e.g., Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use—Rethinking the
Role of the FDA, 358 N. ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008).
47. Cf. JONATHAN OBERLANDER, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF MEDICARE 22 (2003)
(noting that the American Medical Association lobbied against government health
insurance in 1949 by arguing that it would “inevitably erode the quality of medical care
by giving the government [rather than physicians] control over medical services”).
48. See, e.g., BERNARD LO, RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS: A GUIDE FOR
CLINICIANS 12–14 (5th ed. 2013); cf. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (finding that physicians have a duty to obtain informed consent from patients
because “every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body”); Samia A. Hurst & Marion Danis, A Framework for
Rationing by Clinical Judgment, 17 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 247, 248–51 (2007)
(discussing physicians’ obligations to both ration healthcare resources and advocate for
patients’ best interests).
49. See, e.g., LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY,
RESTRAINT 4 (2d ed. 2008); see also COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC
HEALTH, INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 3 (1988) (noting, “public health
does things that benefit everybody”); Onyebuchi A. Arah, On The Relationship between
Individual and Population Health, 12 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 235, 235 (2009)
(contending that “population health calls up images of non-individual health”).
50. Jeffrey M. Drazen, Government in Medicine, 356 N. ENG. J. MED. 2195, 2195
(2007).
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B. The Absence of Federal Regulation
Given this focus on practitioner discretion and individualized care, it is
perhaps to be expected that courts, medical practitioners, and Congress
have not viewed the federal government—and the one-size-fits-all approach
that may come with it—as a natural fit for regulating medical practice.
1. Courts
Courts have often concluded that the federal government does not
regulate medical practice. Throughout the early twentieth century, courts
likely would have struck down federal efforts to directly regulate medical
practice on constitutional grounds. During the Lochner era, the Supreme
Court viewed the federal government’s commerce powers as quite
limited,51 and the doctrine of dual federalism—“the concept that the state
and national governments enjoy exclusive and non-overlapping spheres
of authority”—held sway.52 Moreover, at that time medical practice was
decidedly more local in nature than modern medical practice. Many solo
practitioners provided care in homes, rather than in offices or hospitals,
and prescribed remedies that they made themselves, rather than commercial
drugs.53
In fact, in a 1925 decision, Linder v. United States, the Supreme Court
stated that “[o]bviously, direct control of medical practice in the states is
beyond the power of the federal government.”54 Since Linder, several
lower courts have cited this language to support its stated proposition.55

51. See Noah, supra note 25, at 161; see also Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of
Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 605, 606–09 (1996) (describing the Lochner era).
52. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward A Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 243, 246 (2005); see also United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895)
(“It cannot be denied that the power of a state to protect the lives, health, and property of
its citizens . . . [is] essentially exclusive.”). The idea that the federal government lacked
the constitutional power to regulate medical practice persisted well past the early twentieth
century, with at least one medical scholar claiming in 1969 that “the federal government
cannot assume this function [of regulating medical practice] without an amendment to the
Constitution.” DERBYSHIRE, supra 29, at 18.
53. See, e.g., PHILLIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH 19–24 (2003)
(describing the transition from doctor-made medications to commercial medicines);
STARR, supra note 30, at 60–79 (1982) (describing the end of the solo practitioner era);
Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 476 (2011) (“The
practice of medicine is increasingly nationalized . . . .”).
54. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925).
55. See United States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2004); Oregon v.
Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004) aff’d sub nom. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546
U.S. 243 (2006); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 801 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 198 (9th Cir. 1975); Metrolina Family Practice
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For example, in United States v. Evers, Judge Robert E. Varner of the
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama quoted this language to
support his decision that a physician promoting and administering an
FDA-approved drug for an unapproved use was practicing medicine, not
misbranding drugs under federal law.56 Similarly, in Oregon v. Ashcroft,
the Ninth Circuit quoted this language in holding unlawful a federal
directive declaring physician-assisted suicide, which was permitted under
Oregon law, to be in violation of the federal Controlled Substances Act.57
Yet, in most of the cases in which courts citing Linder considered the
validity of a federal statute or action that arguably restricted medical
practice, the courts upheld those federal statutes and actions.58 In the cases
in which a federal action was not upheld—such as Evers and Oregon v.
Ashcroft—those holdings relied primarily on the scope of the statute at
issue, rather than the scope of the federal government’s constitutional
authority.59
Grp., P.A. v. Sullivan, 767 F. Supp. 1314, 1320–21 (W.D.N.C. 1989) aff’d, 929 F.2d 693
(4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Evers, 453 F. Supp. 1141, 1150 (M.D. Ala. 1978) aff’d,
643 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1981); FTC v. Simeon Mgmt. Corp., 391 F. Supp. 697, 705 (N.D.
Cal. 1975) aff’d, 532 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1976); Henderson v. Wright, No. 954718D, 1996
WL 33401225, at *2 (Mass. Super. Nov. 27, 1996); cf. United States v. Rosen, 582 F.2d
1032, 1035 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing Linder in determining whether prescribing controlled
substances was properly considered the practice of medicine); United States v. Larson,
507 F.2d 385, 388 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing Linder for the proposition that what constitutes
medical practice must be determined based upon attending circumstances and a consideration
of the evidence); O’Reilly v. Bd. of Med. Examiners, 426 P.2d 167, 171 (Cal. 1967) (citing
Linder to uphold a federal exchange program for foreign physicians, “even though the
power to regulate the practice of medicine is ordinarily committed to the states”); N.J.
Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 384 A.2d 795, 808 (N.J. 1978) (citing Linder to
support the proposition that “[p]rofessional licensing and regulation of professional
misconduct are activities which have long been committed to the states . . . .”). The only
Supreme Court opinion that relied on Linder to support the proposition that the federal
government cannot regulate medical practice is the dissent in Lambert v. Yellowley, cited
infra note 64, at 214.
56. See 453 F. Supp. 1141, 1150 (M.D. Ala. 1978) aff’d, 643 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir.
1981).
57. See 368 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d sub nom., Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243 (2006).
58. See, e.g., Singh, 390 F.3d at 190; Metrolina Family Practice Grp., P.A., 767 F.
Supp. at 1320–21; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 801 F.2d at 1169–70; Rosenberg, 515
F.2d at 198.
59. See Evers, 453 F. Supp. at 1150; Gonzales, 368 F.3d. at 1124–25; see also
Epstein, supra note 10, at 5 (arguing that FDA cannot regulate certain stem cell procedures
because of the limits of its enabling statutes). But see Simeon Mgmt. Corp., 391 F. Supp.
at 705 (relying on Linder to hold that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is not
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Despite Linder’s strong language, its holding is limited and its analysis
does not fully support the proposition that the federal government cannot
regulate medical practice.60 In Linder, the Supreme Court overturned Dr.
Charles O. Linder’s federal conviction, under the Harrison Anti-Narcotic
Act, for prescribing narcotics to relieve a patient’s addiction symptoms.61
In reversing Dr. Linder’s conviction, the Court focused on the limits of
what the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, a tax law, authorized, rather than on
constitutional limits on federal authority. The Court’s primary concerns
were that applying the statute to the particular set of facts in Linder was
“plainly inappropriate and unnecessary to reasonable enforcement of [the]
revenue measure,”62 and that Congress did not intend to regulate medical
practice through the statute.63 Although the Court reversed Dr. Linder’s
conviction, it did not strike down the law itself.64
Additionally, only a year after Linder was decided, the Court concluded
that regulating medical practice was not outside the scope of the federal
government’s constitutional authority in Lambert v. Yellowley.65 In
Lambert, a physician sought to enjoin enforcement of a provision in the
National Prohibition Act of 1919 that limited the amount of liquor that
physicians could prescribe, on the grounds that “in certain cases . . . the
use of spirituous liquor . . . in an amount exceeding [the limit] [wa]s
necessary for the proper treatment of patients,” and the “control [of] medical
practice in the states is beyond the power of the federal government.”66
The Court rejected these arguments, concluding that “there is no right to
practice medicine which is not subordinate to . . . the power of Congress
authorized to require physicians to advertise that a drug is not FDA-approved, without
discussing the FTC’s statutory authority).
60. See Noah, supra note 25, at 161; but see PAUL D. CLEMENT & LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, LABORATORY TESTING SERVICES, AS THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE, CANNOT BE
REGULATED AS MEDICAL DEVICES 11 (2015) [hereinafter “CLEMENT & TRIBE”], available
at http://www.acla.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Tribe-Clement-White-Paper-1-6-15.pdf
[http://perma.cc/S5MP-R59J].
61. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 22 (1925). The Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act
imposed a tax on practitioners who distributed narcotics. Id. at 5, 11. Lower courts had
interpreted the law as prohibiting physicians from prescribing narcotics solely to relieve
patients’ addiction symptoms. See id. at 10–12; Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act of 1914, ch.
1, 38 Stat. 785
62. Linder, 268 U.S. at 18.
63. See id. at 22–23.
64. Id. at 18; see also Noah, supra note 25, at 161 (noting that “[i]n 1925, the Court
upheld the federal government’s first controlled substances legislation”).
65. 272 U.S. 581, 596–97 (1926); see also Noah, supra note 25, at 161 (describing
the Court’s opinion in Lambert). But see Lambert, 272 U.S. at 598 (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting) (“Congress . . . cannot directly restrict the professional judgment of the
physician or interfere with its free exercise in the treatment of disease. Whatever power
exists in that respect belongs to the states exclusively.”).
66. Lambert, 272 U.S. at 588, 596.
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to make laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
Eighteenth Amendment.”67 The Twenty-first Amendment repealed the
Eighteenth Amendment of the Constitution, which prohibited the production,
sale, and transport of alcohol. But the Court’s logic in Lambert would
apply equally to Congress’s authority to enact laws necessary and proper
for carrying out its other powers.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Linder was decided at a time
when courts still endorsed the Lochner-era view of regulation and the
doctrine of dual federalism, both of which have long since been repudiated
by courts.68 Accordingly, even if Linder at one time stood for the proposition
that medical practice is beyond the reach of the federal government’s
constitutional powers, it should no longer be viewed as supporting that
proposition. As Lars Noah has argued, “nothing [in the Constitution]
requires that the practice of medicine remain sacrosanct as a potential
subject of federal regulatory involvement.”69
2. Medical Practitioners and Congress
In the absence of a constitutional bar on federal regulation of medical
practice, political forces have discouraged federal oversight. Since the
turn of the twentieth century, medical practitioners have enjoyed “an
especially persuasive claim to [cultural] authority.”70 Although the power
and solidarity of medical practitioners may be waning, organized medicine
continues to possess substantial political influence.71 For example, one
lobbying study estimated that Congressional legislative assistants meet
with physicians 29,000 times per year, and found that legislative assistants
ranked 90% of the physicians with whom they met as either “effective”
or “somewhat effective” at communicating their message.72 Additionally,
67. Id. at 596 (internal citations omitted).
68. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1992) (rejecting dual
federalism); Daniel A. Farber, Who Killed Lochner?, 90 GEO. L.J. 985, 1002–03 (2002)
(reviewing G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000))
(describing the Court’s repudiation of Lochner).
69. Noah, supra note 25, at 192.
70. STARR, supra note 30, at 4.
71. See Michael J. Malinowski, Doctors, Patients, and Pills—A System Popping
Under Too Much Physician Discretion? A Law-Policy Prescription To Make Drug
Approval More Meaningful in the Delivery of Health Care, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1085,
1092, 1097–98 (2012).
72. See Steven H. Landers & Ashwini R. Sehgal, How Do Physicians Lobby Their
Members of Congress?, 160 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 3248, 3248 (2000).
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OpenSecrets.org identifies the American Medical Association (AMA)—
the largest U.S. association of medical professionals—as one of the 140
biggest overall donors to federal elections since the 1990 election cycle.73
Organized medicine has used this clout to lobby against federal legislation
that would govern medical practice,74 and to influence legal proceedings
that implicate medical practice regulation.75
Historically, medical practitioners’ efforts to prevent federal legislation
affecting medical practice were quite successful.76 The AMA’s opposition to
federal-government-mandated or -funded health insurance, which began as
early as 1920, may offer the longest-running example of organized
medicine’s successes.77 This opposition was partly based on concerns about
federal oversight of medical practice78 and, with the exception of Medicare,
was generally effective during the twentieth century.79 For example, the
AMA’s opposition helped persuade President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
administration that health insurance should not be included as part of the
Social Security Act of 1935. A 1939 proposal to provide federal grants to
develop state health insurance plans failed to progress out of subcommittee
after the AMA produced twenty-two arguments against it, and several other
health care reform bills proposed during President Harry S. Truman’s
administration suffered similar fates.80 Consistent with this history, the
AMA opposed President Bill Clinton’s health care reform proposal in the
1990s, spending three million dollars in its efforts defeat the Clinton

73. See Center for Responsive Politics, American Medical Assn, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000000068 [http://perma.cc/8SWJ53GH] (last visited Jan. 13, 2015).
74. See, e.g., STARR, supra note 30, at 260. Medical practitioners also have opposed
specific instances of state legislation, such as a Florida law restricting physicians’ ability
to talk about gun ownership with patients and a California bill that would require
physicians to limit narcotic prescriptions to no more than a thirty-day supply. See
Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1257 (S.D. Fla. 2012); William Heisel,
Everybody Hurts: Bill Tackling Prescription Drug Abuse Felled by Cost Concerns,
REPORTING ON HEALTH (June 6, 2014), http://www.reportingonhealth.org/2014/06/05/
everybody-hurts-bill-tackling-prescription-drug-abuse-felled-cost-concerns [http://perma.cc/
62LX-GDJM].
75. See, e.g., Litig. Ctr., About Us, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.
ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/legal-topics/litigation-center/about-us.page [http://
perma.cc/UMW7-J9TU] (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
76. See STARR, supra note 30, at 260–61.
77. See id. at 247–48; OBERLANDER, supra note 47, at 19, 21–22.
78. See, e.g., OBERLANDER, supra note 47, at 22; SHANNA ROSE, FINANCING MEDICAID:
FEDERALISM AND THE GROWTH OF AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET 28–29 (2013).
79. See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 78, at 27. For a discussion of the role that the AMA’s
opposition to Medicare played in the enactment of Medicaid, see id. at 38–46.
80. See, e.g., STARR, supra note 30, at 269.
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proposal.81 Like the other twentieth century predecessors to President Barack
Obama’s successful health care reform effort, the Clinton Administration’s
health care reform proposal failed.82
In some instances, organized medicine has been able to persuade
Congress to include in the legislation affecting medical practice, provisions
that disavow any intent to regulate medical practice.83 The Social Security
Amendments of 1954, for example, provided that “[n]othing in this
subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the Commissioner of Social
Security or any other officer or employee of the United States to interfere
in any way with the practice of medicine.”84 The Medicare statute,85 the
Fertility Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992,86 the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997,87 the Drug Addiction Treatment
Act of 2000,88 and the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act
of 200789 each included a provision with similar language. Even when a

81. See, e.g., Sam Stein, American Medical Association Trying To Torpedo Health
Care Reform Again, HUFFINGTON POST (July 11, 2009, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2009/06/11/american-medical-associat_n_214132.html [http://perma.cc/APC6QKT3].
82. See, e.g., Robert J. Blendon et al., What Happened to Americans’ Support for
the Clinton Health Plan, 14 HEALTH AFF. 7, 8 (1995).
83. See Noah, supra note 25, at 165–66.
84. Social Security Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-761, § 106, 68 Stat. 1052,
1080 (1954) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 416).
85. Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 102(a), 79 Stat. 290,
291 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395) (“Nothing in [the Medicare statute] shall be
construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or
control over the practice of medicine.”).
86. Pub. L. No. 102-493, § 3(i)(1), 106 Stat. 3146, 3149 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
263a-2(i)(1)) (“In developing the [federal embryo laboratory] certification program, the
[Department of Health and Human Services] may not establish any regulation, standard,
or requirement which has the effect of exercising supervision or control over the practice
of medicine in assisted reproductive technology programs.”).
87. Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 214, 111 Stat. 2296, 2348 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 396)
(“Nothing in [the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act] shall be construed to limit or
interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any
legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health
care practitioner-patient relationship.”).
88. Pub. L. No. 106-310, § 3502, 114 Stat. 1222, 1226 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §
823(g)(2)(H)(i)) (“Nothing in such regulations or practice guidelines may authorize any
Federal official or employee to exercise supervision or control over the practice of
medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided.”).
89. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
§ 1111(d), 121 Stat. 823, 976 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247d-5a(d)) (“Nothing in this section
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statute that affects medical practice does not include such provisions,
concerns about federal regulation of medical practice may still drive
decisions about the law—as demonstrated by the history of the Drug
Quality and Security Act.90
In addition to resisting legislation that would affect medical practice,
the AMA and other medical organizations involve themselves in legal
proceedings that implicate medical practice.91 For example, ten medical
associations, including the AMA and the American Dental Association,
filed a joint amicus brief with the Supreme Court in a case about the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ordering the North Carolina Board of
Dental Examiners to stop sending cease-and-desist letters to teeth-whitening
providers who were not licensed dentists.92 The FTC ordered the Board
to stop sending the cease-and-desist letters on the ground that the Board
was engaging in unfair competition in violation of federal antitrust law.93
In their amicus brief, the medical organizations argued that federal antitrust
law did not apply to the Board, and that affirming the FTC’s position
“would have perverse consequences for patients and the public,” and that
“Federal overturning of state policy choices . . . is particularly inappropriate
where, as here, regulation of the health professions is at issue.”94
Generally, federal antitrust law confers immunity to state actors, as medical
organizations have argued.95 However, because a majority of the Board’s
members were market participants—licensed dentists and a hygienist—
elected by other market participants and because the Board’s actions were
not actively supervised by the state, the Court concluded that the Board’s
cease-and-desist letters were not covered by state-action immunity.96
While the medical organizations’ amicus brief was ultimately unsuccessful
in achieving their aims in this case, it is one example of medical organizations’
opposing federal regulation of medical practice in the litigation setting.

[of the Public Health Service Act] shall be construed to restrict, in any manner, the
prescribing of antibiotics by physicians, or to limit the practice of medicine[.]”).
90. See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Litig. Ctr., supra note 75; Legal Advocacy and Litigation, AM.
DENTAL ASS’N, http://www.ada.org/en/advocacy/legal-advocacy-and-litigation [http://perma.
cc/W5VG-6BSF] (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
92. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015); Amicus
Brief of the American Dental Ass’n et al., supra note 22.
93. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1108–09.
94. Amicus Brief of the American Dental Ass’n et al., supra note 22, at 2, 13.
95. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1110 (citing Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)).
96. See id. at 1112–14. Justice Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented
from this opinion and would have found that federal antitrust law did not apply to the
Board’s actions. Id. at 1118 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Although there are instances in which organized medicine has supported
federal regulation of medical practice, that support was often conditioned
on certain protections for practitioners’ interests. In 1997, the AMA
supported a federal bill that would have prohibited “intact dilation and
evacuation” of a fetus—often referred to as a “partial-birth abortion”—
but only after lawmakers agreed to make clear that physicians could not
be prosecuted for resorting to the procedure to save a mother’s life after
beginning to deliver a baby.97 Moreover, the AMA later came to consider
this conditional support for the 1997 bill a mistake and it did not support
the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act that was eventually passed in
2003 and upheld by the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart.98
Additionally, in a departure from its resistance to healthcare reform in
the twentieth century, the AMA and other organizations supported the
passage of the Obama administration’s health care reform proposal—the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA).99 Although
the PPACA is, perhaps, best known for its provision that subjects
individuals who do not purchase health insurance to a financial penalty—
the “individual mandate”—one of its goals is to influence medical practice
by incentivizing practitioners and hospitals to improve the quality of
medical care.100 The AMA did support the PPACA, however, it opposed
earlier versions of the law that would have created a government-sponsored
insurance plan.101 The AMA’s support for the PPACA may have been

97. See Will an AMA Endorsement Sway Any Votes? A Vote on Late-Term Abortion
Ban Is Set for This Afternoon, CNN (May 20, 1997), http://www.cnn.com/ ALLPOLITICS/
1997/05/20/abortion.ama/ [http://perma.cc/6PSH-ZTNH]; Letter from P. John Seward,
Exec. Vice President, Am. Med. Ass’n, to Rick Santorum, U.S. Senator (May 19, 1997),
available at http://www.gargaro.com/ama.html [http://perma.cc/SWN5-2ZE6].
98. See Amy Sullivan, A Time to Choose: How Democrats Started Losing the
Abortion Debate, WASHINGTON MONTHLY (Dec. 2003), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/
features/2003/0312.sullivan.html [http://perma.cc/X83Q-PJUC]; Gonzales v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124, 132–33 (2007).
99. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010); Lawrence D. Brown, The Elements of Surprise: How Health Reform
Happened, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 419, 424–25 (2011).
100. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501(b); Robert Kocher et al.,
The Affordable Care Act and the Future of Clinical Medicine: The Opportunities and
Challenges, 153 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 536, 536–37 (2010).
101. See Robert Pear, Doctors’ Group Opposes Public Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, June
10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/us/politics/11health.html?_r=2&hp&
[http://perma.cc/37HJ-58QM]. It is worth noting that the AMA is not the only medical
organization, and at least one group, Physicians for a National Health Program, supports
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motivated by the belief that reform was imminent regardless of practitioners’
support, and accordingly, it was best to influence the reform rather than
oppose it outright.102 In sum, the overall trend in organized medicine has
been to oppose federal regulation of medical practice, unless the federal
programs protected practitioners’ interests or their freedom to care for
patients as they see fit.
C. The Presence of State Regulation
The states possess broad authority to regulate the practice of medicine
pursuant to their police powers.103 Against the backdrop of skepticism
about federal regulation of medical practice, states have exercised this
authority to oversee medical practice in a variety of ways.
1. The States’ Authority
The states have long regulated the practice of medicine pursuant to their
general police power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of state
citizens.104 States began to use their police powers to establish modern
licensing requirements for medical practitioners in the late nineteenth
century.105 And since at least 1889, when the Supreme Court decided
Dent v. West Virginia, the Court has recognized states’ authority in this
area.106

a single-payer health insurance system. Id. The AMA is, however, the largest medical
professional association and wields more power than other groups. See id.
102. See Brown, supra note 99, at 424–25.
103. See, e.g., Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910); Edward P. Richards,
The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Practice: A Historical Review and Guide
for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care
Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201, 218 (1999).
104. U.S. CONST. amend. X. See also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62
(1872) (describing the police power as extending “to the protection of the lives, limbs,
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons . . . within the State”); Noah, supra note 25, at
159 (“The Supreme Court long ago recognized that the police powers of the states justified
their regulation of the practice of medicine.”).
105. Before then, virtually anyone, regardless of qualifications or credentials, was
free to call himself “doctor” and treat, or, perhaps more accurately, attempt to treat, patients.
Although the state—and federal—governments’ failure to play any gatekeeping role for
medical practitioners may seem irresponsible, the lack of regulation may have made sense
at the time. Scientific knowledge was limited, and there were several different schools of
medical practice, none of which were particularly effective. Accordingly, there were few
principled bases on which to decide who should, and should not, practice medicine. See,
e.g., MOHR, supra note 23, at 9–21.
106. See 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889); Jost, supra note 30, at 827.
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Dent involved a West Virginia licensing statute that was enacted in
1881.107 The law was passed following determined lobbying efforts in its
support by the Medical Society of West Virginia, which was founded with
the goal of transforming medical practice from an unregulated profession
that included “dangerous pretenders and quacks” into a “learned, sciencebased, and legally-licensed profession.”108 The law required every medical
practitioner in the state to obtain a certificate from a state board affirming
that “he is a graduate of a reputable medical college . . . he has practiced
medicine in the state continuously for the period of 10 years prior to the
8th day of March, 1881”, or he has been found, upon examination by the
board, to be qualified to practice medicine.109 Practicing medicine without
such a certificate was a misdemeanor offense.110
At the time the law was passed, the plaintiff, Frank Dent, had practiced
medicine in West Virginia for seven years as an independent practitioner,
and for five more years as an apprentice to his father.111 The state board
refused to count his five-year apprenticeship when calculating his years
of practice, and accordingly, refused to issue him a certificate because he
had not practiced medicine for the requisite ten years.112 Dent subsequently
received a medical degree, but the board determined that the school granting
it was not a reputable one, and again refused to grant him a certificate.113
Despite the board’s refusals, Dent continued to practice and was convicted
of practicing medicine without a certificate.114
After his conviction, Dent challenged the licensing statute on the ground
that it violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because,
having established a medical practice in West Virginia, he had a property
107. See MOHR, supra note 23, at 63–79.
108. See id. at 27–28, 63–79.
109. Dent, 129 U.S. at 114.
110. See id. Those convicted of practicing without a certificate would be subject to
“fines between $50 and $500, or imprisonment between thirty days and one year, or some
combination of both.” MOHR, supra note 23, at 69. These penalties could be applied to
“each and every” offense, meaning that a practitioner could be subject to up to $500 in
fines and one year in prison for each visit with each patient that he saw. Id.
111. See MOHR, supra note 23, at 99.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 100–03.
114. See Dent, 129 U.S. at 117–18. It is worth noting that Frank Dent came from a
family that had practiced medicine in West Virginia for four generations, and more
importantly, had clashed with the politically powerful founder of the Medical Society of
West Virginia. For a comprehensive discussion of the facts and politics that led to Dent’s
conviction and subsequent litigation, see MOHR, supra note 23.
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right in his practice.115 The Court rejected Dent’s argument and upheld
West Virginia’s licensing requirement as within “[t]he power of the state
to provide for the general welfare of its people.”116 The Court explained
that, while
[i]t is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any
lawful calling, business, or profession he may choose, . . . there is no arbitrary
deprivation of such right where its exercise is not permitted because of a failure
to comply with conditions imposed by the state for the protection of society.117

Since Dent, courts have upheld a broad range of state medical practice
laws against constitutional challenges, making clear that states are generally
authorized to legislate in the medical practice area,118 and that courts are
reluctant to recognize a First or Fourteenth Amendment right to be free
from such regulation. For example in 1921, the Supreme Court upheld a
Minnesota law that prohibited medical practitioners from dispensing
narcotics directly to addicts despite arguments that the law violated the
Fourteenth Amendment and was preempted by federal law.119 In 1997,
the Court rejected Fourteenth Amendment challenges to New York and
Washington’s laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide.120 In 2012, the
Eighth Circuit was not persuaded by abortion providers’ arguments that a
South Dakota law requiring that physicians inform patients seeking an
abortion of an “increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide,” violated
practitioners’ First Amendment rights and unduly burdened access to
abortion.121 And in 2014, the Eleventh Circuit vacated an injunction
against a Florida law restricting practitioners’ ability to communicate with
patients about gun ownership because “it is uncontroversial that a state

115. See Dent, 129 U.S. at 121; see also Jost, supra note 30, at 827 (explaining Dent’s
argument).
116. See Dent, 129 U.S. at 121.
117. Id. at 121–22.
118. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 25, at 159.
119. See Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921).
120. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 796–97 (1997) (holding that New York’s law
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
705–06 (1997) (holding that Washington’s law does not violate the Due Process Clause).
121. Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 897 (8th Cir. 2012). A number
of other state medical practice laws that have been challenged–and upheld–also concern
abortion practices. See, e.g., Erin Bernstein, The Upside of Abortion Disclosure Laws, 24
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 171, 180–86 (2013); infra note 125 and accompanying text; cf.
Guttmacher Inst., An Overview of Abortion Laws, ST. POLICIES IN BRIEF, May 1, 2015,
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/
4RKN-V6QQ] (describing the range of state abortion laws that are in effect).
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may police the boundaries of good medical practice” and “[a]ny burden
the Act places on physician speech is [ ] entirely incidental.”122
This is not to say that states’ authority to regulate medical practice is
limitless. As an example, recently courts have struck down a few state
laws restricting the off-label use of abortion-inducing drugs on the basis
that the laws violate patients’ constitutional rights. In 2013, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court determined that an Oklahoma law prohibiting off-label
use of abortion-inducing drugs unduly burdened abortion access,123 and in
2014 the Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to enjoin a similar Arizona
law.124 But courts also have rejected arguments that comparable Ohio and
Texas laws unduly burden abortion access in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.125 Moreover, that there are relatively few cases striking
down state medical practice laws illustrates that the limits on states’ authority
are few and far between.126
2. Carrying Out State Regulation
States exercise their far-reaching authority to regulate medical practice
in a number of ways. Most importantly, states regulate medical practice
by defining what falls within the scope of medical practice and requiring
122. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1203 (11th Cir. 2014). But
see Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1255, 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (enjoining
the law on the grounds that it violated practitioners’ First and Fourteenth Amendments
rights).
123. See Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice v. Cline, 2012 OK 102, ¶ 3, 292 P.3d 27,
27–28. Oklahoma’s law, unlike other similar state laws, required on-label use of all abortioninducing drugs without exception. This effectively prohibited non-surgical abortions
because the label for mifepristone, the only drug that is FDA-approved for terminating an
intrauterine pregnancy, states that two days after patients take mifepristone, they “must
take” another drug, misoprostol. Mifeprex (Mifepristone) Label, available at http://www.
accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2004/020687s010-lbl.pdf [http://perma.cc/8BNZ8J9Y]. However, while misoprostol can cause abortions, it is not FDA-approved for that
purpose. See Cytotec (Misoprostol) Label, available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
drugsatfda_docs/label/2012/019268s047lbl.pdf [http://perma.cc/S78U-D96M]. Thus, it is
impossible to use all abortion-inducing drugs on label, and requiring the on-label use of
all abortion-inducing drugs without exception de facto prohibits the use of any abortioninducing drugs.
124. See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 918 (9th Cir. 2014).
125. See Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 496 (6th
Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Tex. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 605 (5th Cir. 2014).
126. Cf. Noah, supra note 25, at 159 (“[N]o one today seriously doubts the proposition
that the states enjoy the authority to adopt reasonable restrictions designed to promote the
public health.”).
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that those practicing medicine be licensed.127 Although which specific
activities constitute medical practice vary by state, each state generally
defines medical practice quite broadly. Medical practice generally includes
activities such as diagnosing and treating disease and conditions, as well
as, in some cases holding oneself out as a medical practitioner, testifying
as an expert witness, or reviewing claims for insurance companies.128 By 1895,
all of the existing states had required that anyone practicing medicine be
licensed, and had established state boards to oversee those requirements.129
This continues today—all fifty states have boards that are responsible for
licensing medical practitioners.130 The basic requirements for obtaining a
medical license are consistent across states, and for physicians, include
graduating from an accredited medical school, completing at least one year of
a residency or fellowship, and passing a licensing examination.131 Beyond
these basic requirements there is variation, with some states also requiring,
among other things, interviews, a documented lack of a criminal history,
and proof of malpractice insurance coverage.132 In addition to granting
licenses, state boards are authorized to discipline licensees.133 Depending
on the state, gross incompetence, physical or mental impairment, substance
abuse, and aiding in the unauthorized practice of medicine, among other

127. See, e.g., ROBERT I. FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: COMPLEXITY,
CONFRONTATION, AND COMPROMISE 19 (2007) [hereinafter FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION]
(noting that the “cornerstone” of medical practice regulation is states’ licensing schemes).
128. See supra notes 34–43 and accompanying text.
129. See DERBYSHIRE, supra note 29, at 8.
130. See, e.g., Directory of State Medical and Osteopathic Boards, FED’N OF ST.
MED. BOARDS, http://www.fsmb.org/state-medical-boards/contacts [http://perma.cc/GUW3C596] (last visited Feb. 18, 2015); Boards of Pharmacy, NAT’L ASS’N OF BOARDS OF
PHARMACY, https://www.nabp.net/boards-of-pharmacy [https://perma.cc/ D7JG-ZDDA]; State
Boards, AM. ASS’N OF DENTAL BOARDS, http://www.dentalboards.org/states/index.htm
[http://perma.cc/BCV9-QJFX]. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in North Carolina
State Board of Dental Examiners vs. FTC, discussed in section II.B.2, may lead to some
changes in the composition of these boards or in how they operate. But the decision does
not mean that states generally cannot use such boards to oversee medical practice. See
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
131. See, e.g., Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of
Medical Discipline, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285, 290 (2010); Janet M. Torpy et
al., Medical Licensure, 304 JAMA 1286, 1286 (2010); Robert Kocher et al., Doctors
Without State Borders: Practicing Across State Lines, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 18, 2014),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/02/18/doctors-without-state-borders-practicing-acrossstate-lines/ [http://perma.cc/4NYV-ESQQ].
132. See, e.g., Sawicki, supra note 131, at 291–92; Kocher et al., supra note 131.
133. See, e.g., Timothy S. Jost et al., Consumers, Complaints, and Professional
Discipline: A Look at Medical Licensure Boards, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 309, 326–30 (1993).
In some cases, state boards also might take actions to prevent unlicensed individuals from
practicing medicine. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1108.
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things, are grounds for discipline.134 Disciplinary actions range from minor
reprimands to limiting, suspending, or revoking a license.135
Although defining the scope of medical practice, licensing requirements,
and medical board disciplinary actions are the primary ways that states
regulate medical practice, there are a number of other ways in which states
exert their authority to oversee medicine. As an example, states have
enacted laws and regulations that directly circumscribe how licensed
practitioners conduct medical practice. As discussed in section II.C.1.
above, some states have enacted laws that regulate controversial areas of
medical practice, such as physician-assisted suicide and abortion.136 State
laws and regulations, however, are not limited to these contentious areas.
For instance, every state requires that medical practitioners report certain
infectious diseases to the state.137 In addition, most states have enacted
laws or regulations that encourage a pharmacy to substitute a generic drug
when a physician prescribes a brand-name drug—essentially overriding a
physician’s recommendation for a brand-name drug.138 As a corollary to
the drug substitution laws, twenty-nine states have laws requiring that
pharmacists provide certain information to patients when dispensing a
generic drug that has been substituted for a brand-name drug.139 Some

134. See, e.g., Sawicki, supra note 131, at 291–92.
135. See Jost et al., supra note 133, at 326–31; see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4731.22 (LexisNexis 2006) (“The state medical board . . . may limit, revoke, or suspend
an individual’s certificate to practice, refuse to grant a certificate to an individual, refuse
to register an individual, refuse to reinstate a certificate, or reprimand or place on probation
the holder of a certificate . . . .”).
136. See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text.
137. See Reportable Diseases, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/
ency/article/001929.htm [http://perma.cc/K7C2-SXB6] (last updated May 19, 2013); see,
e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120130 (West 2012) (stating that the California
public health department is required to establish a list of reportable diseases).
138. See Orange Book Preface, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapproval
process/ucm079068.htm [http://perma.cc/D2RX-QSKD] (last updated Mar. 14, 2014);
see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-619(b) (West 2008) (“[U]nless the purchaser
instructs otherwise, the pharmacist may substitute a generic drug product . . . .”); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2549(a) (2011) (specifying the conditions under which a pharmacist
may substitute a generic drug).
139. See SARAH LICHTMAN SPECTOR & MARA YOUDELMAN, NAT’L HEALTH LAW
PROGRAM, ANALYSIS OF STATE PHARMACY LAWS: IMPACT OF PHARMACY LAWS ON THE
PROVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES 23–75 (2010), available at http://www.healthlaw.org/
about/staff/mara-youdelman/all-publications/analysis-of-state-pharmacy-laws-impact-ofstate-pharmacy-laws-on-the-provision-of-language-services#.VWvMTs9VhBc [http://perma.cc/
A3AS-DMWN].
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states require that certain information be provided to patients about various
conditions or treatments. California, for example, requires that physicians
distribute standardized pamphlets to patients about blood transfusions,
breast cancer, gynecological cancers, silicone implants, prostate cancer, and
patients’ rights and remedies when they have been sexually involved with
their therapist.140 States also require that certain procedures be performed
within specific, but varying, timeframes. New Hampshire, Michigan, and
Massachusetts require that infants be treated with eye drops immediately,
within one hour, or within two hours after birth, respectively.141 Similarly,
every state requires that medical practitioners perform certain tests to
screen newborns for genetic or metabolic disorders, although what tests
must be performed differs among the states.142 State legislators in New
York even proposed establishing a dress code for medical practitioners.143
In addition to these state laws and statutes, medical malpractice
liability—a creature of state law—provides a mechanism for private
enforcement of medical practice standards.144 In general, medical practitioners
are liable for harm caused by care that deviates from the professional
standard.145 In addition to making the injured patient “whole” through
compensation, one purpose of holding medical practitioners liable for such
care is to reduce injuries by deterring substandard care.146 While there is

140. MED. BD. OF CAL., GUIDE TO THE LAWS GOVERNING THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
BY PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS 70–71 (7th ed. 2013), available at http://www.mbc.ca.gov/
About_Us/Laws/laws_guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/K3WB-YHSK].
141. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132:6 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5125
(West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 109A (West 2003). Newborns are treated
with drops to prevent eye infections, such as gonorrhea or chlamydia that can be contracted
during delivery if the mother is infected. Your Baby’s First Hours of Life,
WOMENSHEALTH.GOV (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/childbirthbeyond/baby-first-hours.html [http://perma.cc/J5AT-FM23].
142. About Newborn Screening: Conditions Screened by State, BABY’S FIRST TEST,
http://www.babysfirsttest.org/newborn-screening/states [http://perma.cc/9RNC-BG4H]
(last visited Feb. 18, 2015); see also Jennifer Kraszewski et al., Legal Issues in Newborn
Screening: Implications for Public Health Practice and Policy, 121 PUB. HEALTH REP. 92,
92–93 (2006), available at http://www.publichealthreports.org/issueopen.cfm?articleID
=1585 [http://perma.cc/QMF9-GY63] (discussing the legal issues raised by state newborn
screening programs).
143. S.B. 4909, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011), available at http://open.nysenate.
gov/legislation/bill/S4909-2011 [http://perma.cc/E68L-P2TW].
144. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Federalism and the Tort System, 50 RUTGERS L. REV.
1, 2 (1997). Although medical malpractice was traditionally a common law doctrine, a
number of states have enacted statutes that govern aspects of medical malpractice claims,
such as caps on damages. See id. at 3–4.
145. See, e.g., Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful Error: The
Historical Jurisprudence of Medical Malpractice, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1193, 1212 (1992).
146. See, e.g., Michelle M. Mello et al., National Costs of the Medical Liability
System, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1569, 1570 (2010).
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no reliable empirical evidence that malpractice liability actually accomplishes
this goal,147 it nevertheless is another way in which states, rather than the
federal government, regulate medical practice.
Lastly, states historically have relied on professional organizations to
police many areas of medical practice.148 While such self-regulation is
not as pervasive as it once was,149 certain domains of self-regulation persist.
For example, with limited exceptions,150 states generally do not restrict
practitioners’ off-label prescribing; instead, professional organizations have
issued policies describing when off-label use is appropriate.151 Additionally,
before the Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina State Board of
Dental Examiners vs. FTC discussed in section II.B.2., some scholars
argued that, because medical practitioners generally comprise a majority
of the members of state medical boards, practitioners effectively govern
their own licensure and discipline.152 It is not yet clear how, or whether,
North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners will change the composition
of state boards, or how they operate.153 Nevertheless, delegating oversight
to the medical profession itself is another way states oversee—or decline
to oversee—medical practice.
147. See id.; Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical
Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1606–15
(2002). This is not to say that medical malpractice liability serves no purpose. In addition
to compensating injured patients, scholars have argued that malpractice liability brings
medical errors to light, and in certain specialties, has improved patient safety. See, e.g.,
TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 93–117 (2005).
148. See FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION, supra note 127, at 24–28; ROBERT I.
FIELD, MOTHER OF INVENTION: HOW THE GOVERNMENT CREATED “FREE MARKET” HEALTH
CARE 122–30 (2013) [hereinafter FIELD, MOTHER OF INVENTION]; STARR, supra note 30, at
24–28; Malinowski, supra note 71, at 1091–99.
149. See, e.g., Scott Gottlieb, How American Doctors Lost Their Professional
Autonomy, FORBES (May 16, 2014, 8:24 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottgottlieb/
2014/05/16/how-american-doctors-lost-their-professional-autonomy/ [http://perma.cc/B8MLH7RR].
150. See supra notes 123–23 and accompanying text for a discussion of state laws
restricting off-label use of abortion-inducing drugs.
151. See, e.g., Dresser & Frader, supra note 45, at 479.
152. See, e.g., M. Christine Cagle et al., Privatizing Professional Licensing Boards:
Self-Governance or Self-Interest?, 30 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 734, 750–51 (1999).
153. See, e.g., Lisa Schencker, Supreme Court Ruling Carries Implications for
Regulatory Boards, Modern Healthcare (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.
com/article/20150225/NEWS/150229950/supreme-court-ruling-carries-implications-forregulatory-boardsl [http://perma.cc/PX5C-3TZJ]; see also N.C. State Bd. of Dental
Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1123 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is not clear what
sorts of changes [to boards] are needed to satisfy the test that [the majority] now adopts.”).
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III. CHALLENGING THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
As the previous section demonstrates, the states extensively regulate
medical practice—but, as this section shows, the federal government also
plays a substantial, although haphazard and at times opaque, role in
controlling medical practice, both directly and indirectly.154
A. Examples of Federal Regulation
This section synthesizes the evidence challenging the conventional
wisdom to show that there are multiple circumstances in which the federal
government oversees medical practice. From wide-ranging oversight,
such as regulating the use of controlled substances,155 influencing medical
decision-making through Medicare payment policies,156 and the PPACA’s
incentives for improving the quality of medical care,157 to narrower instances
of oversight such as the federal ban on off-label use of Human Growth
Hormone,158 the federal government exercises an enormous amount of
control over certain areas of medicine. Although by no means exhaustive,159
the following examples of direct and indirect federal regulation of medical
154. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662
(1998) (describing, in general but not in the medicine context, both direct and indirect
forms of regulation).
155. See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text; infra notes 154–74 and
accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 214–31 and accompanying text.
157. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(a),
124 Stat. 119, 242–44 (2010); Robert Kocher et al., The Affordable Care Act and the
Future of Clinical Medicine: The Opportunities and Challenges, 153 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MED. 536, 536–37 (2010).
158. See infra notes 174–75 and accompanying text.
159. For instance, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) is
a federal law that influences medical practice that is not discussed in depth in this section.
In short, EMTALA requires hospitals that participate in Medicare and offer emergency
services to provide treatment and stabilizing care to patients with emergency medical
conditions, regardless of their ability to pay. Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs.,
Emergency Medical Treatment & Labor Act (EMTALA), CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.
gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EMTALA/index.html?redirect=/EMTALA/ [http://
perma.cc/8A74-AN9B] (last modified Mar. 26, 2012). The PPACA’s incentives for
practitioners and hospitals to improve the quality of medical care, the application of the
Americans with Disabilities Act to dentists’ decisions about which patients to treat, and
the national coordination of physician discipline through the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986 are additional examples of federal influence over medical
practice that are not discussed in depth in this section. See Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act § 1501(b) (providing incentives for practitioners and hospitals to improve quality
of care); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998) (holding that HIV infection is a
disability within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act, in a case involving
dental care); FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION, supra note 127, at 31–32 (describing the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act).
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practice illustrate the many ways that the federal government regulates
medicine.
1. Direct Regulation
The following are examples of direct federal regulation of medical
practice—where the federal government explicitly restricts practitioners’
behavior, and practitioners can be penalized for failing to comply with
such restrictions.
a. The Controlled Substances Act
The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA) is one example of direct
federal regulation of medical practice.160 The CSA authorizes the federal
government to regulate controlled substances, which include FDAapproved drugs that are associated with a risk of addiction or abuse.161
Under the CSA, the federal government directly regulates medical practice in
two ways: (1) it restricts how controlled substances are used in medical
practice; and (2) it dictates which practitioners may use controlled substances.
First, the use of a controlled substance is restricted based on which of
five “schedules” the drug falls into. Controlled substances are categorized
into these five schedules depending on their potential for abuse, accepted
medical uses, and safety, with substances in Schedule I subject to the most
severe restrictions and substances in Schedule V subject to the least
severe.162 Because drugs in Schedule I are deemed to have no accepted
medical uses, practitioners may not prescribe, dispense, or distribute them.163
160. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-513, §§ 100–411, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242–84 (1970).
161. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(6), 811(c), 812 (2012); see also Aaron Gilson & Ben A.
Rich, Legal and Regulatory Issues in Pain Management, in ESSENTIALS OF PAIN MEDICINE
(Honorio Benzon et al. eds., 3d ed. 2001). Certain controlled substances, such as
extended-release and long-acting opioids, are also subject to FDA-required Risk
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies that indirectly control how medical practitioners may
use those drugs. See discussion infra section III.A.2.b.
162. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (2012); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMIN., OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, PRACTITIONER’S MANUAL 5–6 (2006) [hereinafter
DEA MANUAL], available at http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/manuals/pract/pract
_manual012508.pdf [http://perma.cc/8295-BAPY].
163. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2012); DEA MANUAL, supra note 162, at 5. For
example, because marijuana is a Schedule I drug, practitioners violate federal law if they
choose to treat their patients with marijuana, even if state law permits it. Cf. Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (holding that the CSA applied to patients’ intrastate use of
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Drugs in Schedules II through V may be used in medical practice, but their
use is limited. For example, for Schedule II drugs, such as hydrocodone,164
practitioners must provide written prescriptions for the drugs—they may
not provide oral prescriptions over the phone—and no refills are permitted.165
Also, drugs in Schedules II through V may not be prescribed for
“detoxification treatment” or “maintenance treatment” unless the FDA
has approved them for that use.166
Second, under the CSA, the federal government controls who may use
controlled substances in their medical practice.167 In order to prescribe,
distribute, or dispense controlled substances in Schedules II through V,
practitioners must register with the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), the agency primarily responsible for enforcing the CSA.168 The
DEA may refuse to register a practitioner if it determines that registering
the practitioner “would be inconsistent with the public interest.”169
Furthermore, if practitioners are convicted of an offense under the CSA
punishable by more than one year in prison, the federal government may
order them to forfeit their state-issued medical license.170
Because the CSA authorizes the federal government to govern the use
of controlled substances and which medical practitioners may use them,
it is unsurprising that the legislative history and cases concerning the
CSA, discuss its impact on medical practice. In hearings before a Senate
Subcommittee prior to the CSA’s enactment, the American Psychiatric
Association expressed concern that these “enforcement authorities seemed to

medical marijuana permitted under California law). That said, the federal government has
chosen to limit its enforcement of federal prohibitions on marijuana in certain circumstances.
See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
All U.S. Attorneys, on Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013),
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [http://
perma.cc/F8U9-CVSD].
164. Hydrocodone is an opioid found in many drugs that are approved for pain relief;
fixed-dose combinations of hydrocodone and acetaminophen—the active ingredient in
Tylenol—are some of the most widely used drugs in the United States. Although drugs
containing hydrocodone as their sole active ingredient have long been in Schedule II, the
DEA recently moved the fixed-dose combinations of hydrocodone and acetaminophen to
Schedule II as well. See Schedules of Controlled Substances: Rescheduling of Hydrocodone
Combination Products from Schedule III to Schedule II, 79 Fed. Reg. 49,661, 49,662,
49,675 (Aug. 22, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1308), available at http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-08-22/pdf/2014-19922.pdf [http://perma.cc/4D7G-NUSJ].
165. See 21 U.S.C. § 829(a) (2012).
166. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(c) (2014).
167. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(10), 823 (2012); DEA MANUAL, supra note 162, at 4, 7.
168. See DEA MANUAL, supra note 162, at 7.
169. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2012).
170. See 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2012); United States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168, 190 (2d Cir.
2004).
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be dictating the practice of medicine.”171 Additionally, although courts
have generally rejected arguments that the CSA impermissibly regulates
medical practice,172 the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the CSA
regulates medical practice, at least in a limited way. In Gonzales v. Oregon,
the Court explained that “Congress regulates medical practice insofar as
it bars doctors from using their prescription-writing powers as a means to
engage in illicit drug dealing and trafficking,” but also that the CSA
“manifests no intent to regulate the practice of medicine generally . . . .”173
However, because controlled substances include some of the most widely
used drugs in the United States,174 the CSA’s impact on medicine is, in
practice, quite extensive.
b. Use of Human Growth Hormone
Another example of direct federal regulation involves drugs containing
Human Growth Hormone (HGH). For most prescription drugs, once they
receive FDA approval, a practitioner may prescribe, dispense, or administer
them for any use, including off-label uses.175 This, however, is not the
case for HGH. Section 303(e) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA) prohibits knowingly prescribing, dispensing, or administering
HGH for anything other than its FDA-approved uses.176 Human Growth
Hormone is approved for a variety of indications, including the treatment
of children with short stature and adults with growth hormone deficiency,177
171. Federal Drug Abuse and Drug Dependence Prevention, Treatment, and
Rehabilitation Act of 1970: Hearing on S. 3562 Before the Special Subcomm. on
Alcoholism & Narcotics of the S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 91st Cong. 248 (1970)
[hereinafter 1970 CSA Senate Hearing].
172. See, e.g., Singh, 390 F.3d at 190.
173. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269–70 (2006).
174. See Schedules of Controlled Substances: Rescheduling of Hydrocodone
Combination Products From Schedule III to Schedule II, 79 Fed. Reg. 49,661, 49,675
(Aug. 22, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1308), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-08-22/pdf/2014-19922.pdf [http://perma.cc/4D7G-NUSJ].
175. See, e.g., Dresser & Frader, supra note 45, at 476. With the exception of HGH
and the limits on prescribing controlled substances for detoxification and maintenance
treatment, the federal government currently does not prohibit off-label prescribing and,
with the exception of abortion-inducing drugs, states also have not restricted practitioners’
discretion to prescribe off-label.
176. 21 U.S.C. § 333(e) (2012); Dresser & Frader, supra note 45, at 477 n.11.
177. See, e.g., Humatrope, Label, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/
label/2011/019640s084lbl.pdf [http://perma.cc/XKN2-Y23Y]; see also Thomas T. Perls
et al., Provision or Distribution of Growth Hormone for Antiaging: Clinical and Legal
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but not the anti-aging and athletic performance-enhancing uses with
which it is often associated.178
Interestingly, unlike the other examples of federal regulation described
in this section, the addition of section 303(e) to the FDCA did not spark
concerns about federal regulation of medical practice. Moreover,
notwithstanding that this provision was added to the FDCA in 1990,179
in 1997 Congress opined:
[I]t has been the long held view of Congress that the FDA should not regulate the
practice of medicine. In general, the FDA has no authority to regulate how
physicians prescribe approved drugs in the context of their medical practice.
Physicians prescribing off-label uses of approved drugs is not within the
jurisdiction of the FDA.180

This failure to acknowledge section 303(e)’s effect on medical practice
may arise from Congress’s interest in the use of HGH to enhance athletic
performance, rather than in its therapeutic uses. Congress added section
303(e) to the FDCA through the Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990.181
The law was enacted after congressional hearings about widespread use
of performance-enhancing drugs in sports,182 as well as several high
profile athletic scandals, including a 1988 Sports Illustrated story reporting
extensive steroid use in the University of South Carolina’s football program
that led to the indictment of four coaches.183 Consistent with this context,
Issues, 294 JAMA 2086, 2087 (2005) (summarizing the approved uses of various HGHcontaining drugs); S. Jay Olshansky & Thomas T. Perls, New Developments in the Illegal
Provision of Growth Hormone for “Anti-Aging” and Bodybuilding, 299 JAMA 2792,
2792 (2008) (describing approved adult indications for HGH-containing drugs).
178. See, e.g., Olshansky & Perls, supra note 175, at 2792.
179. See United States Attorneys’ Manual, Human Growth Hormone/Steroids
Statutory Overview, OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS, http://www.justice.gov/usam/civilresource-manual-19-human-growth-hormonesteroids-statutory-overview [http://perma.
cc/CV8Y-ZY6T] [hereinafter Manual, HGH/Steroids] (last visited May, 15, 2015).
180. H.R. REP. NO. 105-310, at 60 (1997).
181. See Manual, HGH/Steroids, supra note 179. The Anabolic Steroids Control
Act was enacted as Title XIX of the Crime Control Act of 1990. See Crime Control Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1904, 104 Stat 4851, 4853 (1990).
182. See Anabolic Steroid Control Act: Hearing on H.R. 4658 Before the Subcomm.
on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 8 (1990) (statement of Rep.
William J. Hughes, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Crime); Abuse of Steroids in Amateur and
Professional Athletics: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 2, 10 (1990) (statements of Rep. William J. Hughes, Chairman, H.
Subcomm. on Crime & Paul J. Tagliabue, NFL Comm’r); see also Steroids in Amateur
and Professional Athletics: The Medical and Social Costs of Steroids Abuse: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 179 (1989) (statement of Bill Fralic,
NFL Player) (hearing in which witnesses testified to rampant steroid use in the NFL).
183. See Tommy Chalkin & Rick Telander, The Nightmare of Steroids, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 24, 1988), http://www.si.com/vault/1988/10/24/118707/the-nightmare-ofsteroids-south-carolina-lineman-tommy-chaikin-used-bodybuilding-drugs-for-three-years-
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many of the criminal investigations and prosecutions brought under
section 303(e) have involved practitioners providing HGH to athletes.184
c. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act185 is a third example of direct
federal regulation. This federal law, enacted in 2003, prohibits physicians
from knowingly performing a procedure that the law calls “partial-birth
abortion.”186 The statute defines a partial-birth abortion as “an abortion
in which the person performing the abortion . . . deliberately and intentionally
vaginally delivers a living fetus” until a certain portion of the fetus is
outside the mother’s body, and “performs the overt act, other than completion
of delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus.”187 As interpreted
by the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart, the case upholding the law,
this language prohibits physicians from intentionally performing one
particular abortion procedure: “intact dilation and evacuation.”188
Congress clearly intended to directly regulate medical practice by
prohibiting this procedure. In upholding the law, the Supreme Court
noted, “the legislative power [was] exercised in this instance . . . to
regulate the medical profession.”189 Consistent with the Court’s view, the
medical profession perceived this law as interfering with medical practice.
For example, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG), which is “the leading professional association of physicians who
specialize in the health care of women,” argued said that the law “will
they-drove-him-to-violence-and-nearly-to-suicide [http://perma.cc/GC8Z-S6FZ]; 4 ExFootball Aides Indicted in South Carolina Steroid Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1989,
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/20/sports/4-ex-football-aides-indicted-in-south-carolinasteroid-case.html [http://perma.cc/QNE3-YWKZ].
184. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Powermedica Defendants
Sentenced for Conspiracy to Illegally Distribute Human Growth Hormones and Steroids
(Apr. 20, 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm252
150.htm [http://perma.cc/L8WD-2JYT]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Colorado
Springs Pharmacists Convicted of Charges Related to Importation and Distribution of
Anabolic Steroids and Chinese-Made Human Growth Hormones (Jan. 2, 2010), available
at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm200282.htm [http://perma.cc/92
MF-687S].
185. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201
(2003).
186. See 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2012).
187. Id. § 1531(b)(1).
188. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 154–56 (2007).
189. Id. at 166.
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chill doctors from providing a wide range of procedures used to perform
induced abortions or to treat cases of miscarriage.”190
2. Indirect Regulation
The following examples illustrate indirect regulation of medical
practice—that is, they are examples of federal requirements that do not
apply to practitioners and practitioners do not incur penalties when the
requirements are violated but, nevertheless, they affect medical practice.
a. FDA’s Pre-Market Authorization of Drugs, Devices, and Biologics
Although courts, Congress, and the FDA have attempted to draw a firm
line between what constitutes regulating medical practice versus medical
products,191 the FDA’s review of medical products—drugs, devices, and
biologics—before they enter the market offers one of the most sweeping
examples of how the federal government indirectly regulates medical
practice. In general, drugs, biologics, and medical devices cannot be used
for medical treatment in the United States until the FDA determines that
they are safe and effective.192 Although medical product manufacturers
and sellers, rather than practitioners, typically incur penalties for marketing
unapproved medical products,193 medical practitioners’ options for treating
their patients are limited by the FDA’s judgment about what products are

190. Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (Nos. 05-380,
1382), 2006 WL 2867888, at *1, *22; Am. Cong. Of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
ACOG Statement on the US Supreme Court Decision Upholding the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003, ACOG (Apr. 18, 2007), http://www.acog.org/About_ ACOG/
News_Room/News_Releases/2007/ACOG_Statement_on_the_US_Supreme_Court_Dec
ision [http://perma.cc/6YYN-F79U].
191. See, e.g., supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text; see also CLEMENT & TRIBE,
supra note 60, at 11 (arguing that the FDA lacks authority over certain diagnostics because
they constitute medical practice, rather than medical products).
192. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(d), 360c(i), 360e (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(B) (2012).
There are some medical products that may be sold without FDA approval. For example,
drugs that are “generally recognized . . . as safe and effective” and have been used “to a
material extent” and “for a material time” may be marketed without FDA approval. See
21 U.S.C. §§ 321(p), 355(a) (2012).
193. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prohibits a number of activities,
such as introducing an unapproved drug or device into interstate commerce, that entities
which make and sell medical products, rather than practitioners, are likely to violate. See
21 U.S.C. § 331 (2012); but see United States v. Regenerative Scis., LLC, 741 F.3d 1314,
1326 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (affirming an injunction against practitioners who provided autologous
stem cell treatments in violation of the FDCA).
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safe and effective.194 That is, the FDA indirectly regulates medical practice
by determining which medical products may be sold, and thus, used, by
medical practitioners, in the United States.
Indeed, throughout the FDA’s history, concerns have been raised that
the FDA’s role as gatekeeper of medical products is tantamount to the
regulation of medical practice. For example, when Congress amended the
FDCA in 1962 to require that a drug’s effectiveness be demonstrated
before marketing, the AMA opposed the amendments on the ground that
the FDA’s effectiveness determinations about drugs would interfere with
physicians’ ability to provide treatments in their patients’ best interests.195
In a Senate hearing on the 1962 amendments, an AMA spokesperson
asserted, “only the individual physician [can] determine the efficacy of a
given drug in the treatment of a given patient.”196 Likewise, one Newsweek
columnist argued “[i]t is a dangerous legal precedent to allow any bureaucrat
to keep off the market something that, even though harmless, is in his
opinion ‘ineffective.’ This is trying to protect the patient against the judgment
of his doctor.”197 When amendments to the FDA’s regulatory scheme for
devices were enacted in 1997, Congress included language protecting
practitioners’ discretion to prescribe and administer legally marketed devices
off-label, presumably to address concerns about the FDA interfering with
medical practice.198 Moreover, the notion that authorizing the FDA to
evaluate the effectiveness of medical products is “dangerous” for patients
persists today, particularly in the context of terminally ill patients’ access

194. Because the FDA’s statutory authority is linked to the movement of a product
or its components through interstate commerce, theoretically, there may be some medical
products produced and used wholly intrastate that would not be subject to the FDA’s
oversight. It is difficult, however, to conceive of a modern medical product, except
perhaps medical marijuana, that does not travel in interstate commerce such that the FDA
would not have jurisdiction over it. Cf. Regenerative Scis., 741 F.3d at 1326 (affirming
the FDA’s jurisdiction over autologous stem cell treatments); but see Epstein, supra note
10, at 1–2 (arguing that the FDA’s statutory authority does not extend to the autologous
stem cell treatments at issue in Regenerative Sciences).
195. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(c), 76 Stat. 780, 781
(1962); HILTS, supra note 53, at 139–40.
196. Richard Harris, The Annals of Legislation: The Real Voice-II, THE NEW YORKER,
Mar. 21, 1964, at 146 [hereinafter Harris, The Real Voice-II].
197. HILTS, supra note 53, at 140.
198. See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-115, § 214, 111 Stat. 2296, 2348 (1997) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 396); Noah, supra
note 25, at 166.
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to unapproved therapies.199 While the language of its enabling statute may
prevent the FDA from restricting off-label use of medical devices, it
nevertheless indirectly regulates medical practice by determining which
therapeutic products may be used in medical practice.
b. FDA-Required Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies
The FDA’s drug safety authority provides another example of how the
agency indirectly regulates medical practice. The Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA)200 significantly
strengthened the FDA’s drug safety authority by, among other things,
authorizing it to require Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies
(REMS) for certain drugs.201 The FDA can require a REMS for a prescription
drug when the agency determines that a REMS is necessary to ensure that
a drug’s benefits outweigh its risks.202 Put simply, REMS impose requirements
on a drug manufacturer that go beyond providing warnings and other
information on a drug’s label.203 Through a REMS, the FDA can require,
among other things, that drug manufacturers undertake various “elements to

199. See, e.g., Christina Corieri, Everyone Deserves the Right to Try: Empowering
the Terminally Ill to Take Control of Their Treatment, GOLDWATER INST. (Feb. 11, 2014),
http://goldwaterinstitute.org/en/work/topics/healthcare/right-to-try/everyone-deservesright-try-empowering-terminally-/ [http://perma.cc/7G4A-873W]; see also Patricia J.
Zettler & Henry T. Greely, The Strange Allure of State Right-to-Try Laws, 174 JAMA
INTERNAL MED. 1885 (2014) (discussing the Right-to-Try movement at the state level);
Seema K. Shah & Patricia J. Zettler, From A Constitutional Right to A Policy of
Exceptions: Abigail Alliance and the Future of Access to Experimental Therapy, 10 YALE
J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 135 (2010) (analyzing terminally ill patients’ access to
unapproved drugs in general).
200. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
§§ 901–921, 121 Stat. 823, 922-62 (Sept. 27, 2007).
201. See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a) (2012); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: FORMAT AND CONTENT OF PROPOSED RISK EVALUATION AND
M ITIGATION S TRATEGIES (REMS), REMS A SSESSMENTS , AND P ROPOSED REMS
M ODIFICATIONS (Sept. 2009) [hereinafter DRAFT REMS G UIDANCE], available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/UCM184128.pdf [http://perma.cc/93
GU-R58Y] (describing the REMS provisions in FDAAA); Bruce M. Psaty & David Korn,
Congress Responds to the IOM Drug Safety Report—In Full, 298 JAMA 2185 (2007)
(“FDAAA represents the most extensive revisions of the [FDCA] since 1962.”).
202. See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a), (b). More specifically, the FDA can require REMS
for prescription drugs, including controlled substances, that are submitted for approval or
are already approved under a new drug application (NDA), an abbreviated—generic—
new drug application (ANDA), or a biological license application (BLA).
203. See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1; DRAFT REMS GUIDANCE, supra note 201, at 2–7.
REMS requirements apply to the person(s) who submit for approval covered NDAs,
ANDAs, or BLAs, or who hold approved applications of these types. 21 U.S.C. § 3551(a). Because these persons are typically the drug’s manufacturer, for simplicity this
Article describes the REMS requirements as applying to a drug’s manufacturer.
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assure safe use,” such as ensuring that practitioners who prescribe or
dispense the drug have special training, a drug is dispensed only in certain
settings such as hospitals, or that certain test results are documented
before a drug is dispensed.204
Isotretinoin—commonly known by its brand name, Accutane—is an
example of a drug subject to a REMS that imposes some of these
restrictions.205 Isotretinoin is approved for the treatment of “severe
recalcitrant nodular acne,” but causes serious birth defects when taken by
pregnant women and girls.206 Accordingly, the REMS for isotretinoin
requires the drug’s manufacturers to ensure that isotretinoin prescribers
and dispensers are specially certified, and women and girls have two negative
pregnancy tests documented nineteen days apart before a pharmacist
dispenses the drug.207 To become certified, prescribers must agree to provide
contraception counseling and pregnancy testing for women and girls, and
pharmacies that dispense the drug must affirm that their pharmacists will
dispense the drug only to REMS-qualified patients and dispense no more
than a 30-day supply of the drug.208
The drug manufacturer is the entity ultimately responsible for ensuring
that REMS requirements are met—meaning that the drug manufacturer,
and not medical practitioners, will be the subject of any FDA enforcement
actions that result from REMS violations.209 REMS requirements, however,
do affect medical practice because practitioners are responsible for carrying
out many of the elements to assure safe use. In some ways, REMS
requirements’ impact on medical practice is fairly limited because, of the
approximately 22,000 approved brand-name and generic prescription
204. See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(3)(A), (C), (D).
205. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGY
(REMS), THE IPLEDGE PROGRAM, SINGLE SHARED SYSTEM FOR ISOTRETINOIN (Apr. 2012),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationfor
PatientsandProviders/UCM234639.pdf [hereinafter IPLEDGE]. Accutane’s manufacturer
withdrew Accutane from the market in 2009, but numerous generic versions of the drug
continue to be marketed. See Determination That ACCUTANE (Isotretinoin) Capsules,
10 Milligrams, 20 Milligrams, and 40 Milligrams, Were Not Withdrawn from Sale for
Reasons of Safety or Effectiveness, 75 Fed. Reg. 39024, 39025 (July 7, 2010), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-07-07/pdf/2010-16439.pdf [http://perma.cc/CG
P2-J6NU].
206. See, e.g., Absorbica, Label, available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugs
atfda_docs/label/2012/021951s000lbl.pdf [http://perma.cc/X5CR-Z568].
207. See IPLEDGE, supra note 205.
208. Id.
209. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 333(f)(4)(A), 352(y), 355(p) (2012).
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drugs,210 only about 121 are subject to REMS that include elements to
assure safe use.211 But when a drug is subject to a REMS that includes
elements to assure safe use, how practitioners use that drug is significantly
affected by tasks that they must perform, such as pregnancy testing and
patient counseling in the case of isotretinoin. Discussions of the FDA’s
REMS authority have acknowledged this reality. The AMA, for example,
has said that REMS “affect the daily practice of medicine,”212 and a
pharmacist writing in Pharmacy Times argued that “REMS ha[ve] the
potential to interfere with the practice of medicine.”213 Risk Evaluation
and Mitigation Strategies thus provide an additional example of the FDA
indirectly regulating medical practice.
c. Medicare Coverage Levels and Covered Benefits
Notwithstanding the first provision in the Medicare statute, which states
“[n]othing in this [law] shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer
or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of
medicine,”214 the coverage levels and covered benefits under Medicare
offer a third example of indirect federal regulation of medical practice.215
Medicare is a government-funded insurance program for individuals sixtyfive years of age and older who qualify for Social Security retirement
benefits.216 In general, Medicare covers “items or services” that are
210. See, e.g., Development and Distribution of Patient Medication Information for
Prescription Drugs; Public Hearing, 75 Fed. Reg. 52765, 52766 (Aug. 27, 2010), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-08-27/pdf/2010-21326.pdf [http://perma.cc/LH
7Z-LQNQ].
211. See Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), FDA (May
19, 2014) [hereinafter List of Approved REMS], http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/
postmarketdrugsafetyinformationforpatientsandproviders/ucm111350.htm [http://perma.cc/E2
Z4-738T]. Although there are only about forty approved REMS with elements to assure
safe use, each “single shared system” REMS applies to multiple drugs.
212. AM. MED. ASS’N, REPORT 8 OF THE COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH
R EPORT , THE E VOLVING C ULTURE OF D RUG S AFETY IN THE U NITED STATES: RISK
EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES (REMS) 1 (2010).
213. Darshan Kulkarni, Is REMS Interfering with the Practice of Medicine?,
PHARMACY TIMES (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.pharmacytimes.com/blogs/for-the-record/
0312/Is-REMS-Interfering-With-the-Practice-of-Medicine [http://perma.cc/ANZ5-HRYV].
214. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2012).
215. See, e.g., FIELD, MOTHER OF INVENTION, supra note 148, at 132 (describing how
Medicare transformed medical practice); Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust,
55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 501 n.151 (2002) (“Medicare supervises or controls medical
practice in countless ways.”).
216. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2012); see also Patricia Barry, Do You Qualify for Medicare?,
AARP BULLETIN (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.aarp.org/health/medicare-insurance/info-042011/medicare-eligibility.html [http://perma.cc/V8WY-93YV] (explaining who qualifies
for Medicare). Medicare also covers certain individuals who are under 65 years of age,
such as those with end-stage renal disease. See id.

464

ZETTLER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 52: 427, 2015]

7/27/2015 1:55 PM

Federal Oversight of Medicine
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

“reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or
injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body member.”217
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)—the federal
agency that administers Medicare—determines what items and services
qualify as “reasonable and necessary,” and how much to pay for them.218
Medical decisions, in turn, are affected by which products and services
are covered, and the amount that Medicare pays for them. For example,
one study found that a provision in the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA)219 that changed
how physician reimbursements for outpatient chemotherapy drugs were
calculated, affected which chemotherapy drugs physicians prescribed for
their patients with metastatic cancer.220 Physicians generally bill Medicare
directly for drugs that the physician purchases and administers to the
patient, like chemotherapy drugs.221 Before the MMA was enacted,
physicians were reimbursed for such drugs at ninety-five percent of the
Average Wholesale Price of the drug,222 which created a financial incentive
to administer drugs for which the difference between the physician’s cost
and ninety-five percent of Average Wholesale Price was greatest.223 After
the MMA eliminated this incentive, oncologists selected different

217. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (2012).
218. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395g, 1395w–4 (2012); MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY
COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 245 (Mar. 2003), available
at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/Mar03_Entire_report.pdf?sfvrsn=0 [http://
perma.cc/5M48-NPMK].
219. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
220. Mireille Jacobson et al., Does Reimbursement Influence Chemotherapy Treatment
for Cancer Patients?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 437, 437 (2006).
221. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.: MEDICARE
REIMBURSEMENT OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 1 (Jan. 2001), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/
oei/reports/oei-03-00-00310.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWZ6-JA4F]. Physicians also receive
a separate fee for administering the drug, which is intended to compensate their time and
effort, and the expenses of operating a medical practice. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, MEDICARE: PAYMENTS FOR COVERED
OUTPATIENT DRUGS EXCEED PROVIDERS’ COST 14 (Sept. 2001) [hereinafter GAO, MEDICARE
REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d011118.pdf [http://perma.cc/89DXSQQT].
222. See Jacobson et al., supra note 220, at 437. The Average Wholesale Price is a
term that CMS has defined by regulation. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.517 (2014).
223. See GAO, MEDICARE REPORT, supra note 221, at 4. Although physicians could
have elected to bill Medicare at rates below ninety-five percent of the Average Wholesale
Price, very few did. See id.
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chemotherapy drugs for their patients with metastatic cancer.224 In other
words, the study found that the amount of reimbursement did not affect
whether oncologists treated their patients with chemotherapy, but did
affect which chemotherapy drugs oncologists prescribed their patients.225
Similarly, a study of a 1991 change in Medicare’s reimbursement policy
for recombinant human erythropoietin treatment for dialysis patients
demonstrated that the change in policy affected patients’ treatment.226
Specifically, after the policy change tied reimbursement more closely to
the amount of erythropoietin that was administered to a patient, the mean
dose per treatment increased.227 These studies demonstrate that, by deciding
what products and services are covered and their reimbursement amounts,
Congress and CMS can influence medical practice. Beyond influencing
medical practice through payment structures, Congress also has used
Medicare to more directly regulate medical practice by, for example,
restricting to whom a healthcare provider may refer Medicare patients.228
Thus, it is unsurprising that, similar to the other examples in this section,
there is concern that Medicare could affect medical practice. This is most
clearly demonstrated by language in the Medicare statute that explicitly
prohibits federal interference with medical practice.229 Yet, as the studies
described above make clear, this language has not had the desired effect
of completely preventing Medicare’s interference with medical practice,
and courts have generally rejected arguments that Medicare policies interfere
with medical practice in violation of this provision.230 Additionally, because
private insurers often follow Medicare’s lead, the effect of the federal
government’s decisions likely reach beyond Medicare patients.231

224. See Jacobson et al., supra note 220, at 442.
225. See id.
226. See Neil. R. Powe et al., Medicare Payment Policy and Recombinant
Erythropoietin Prescribing for Dialysis Patients, 22 AM. J. KIDNEY DISEASE 557, 557
(1993).
227. See id.
228. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012).
229. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2012).
230. See, e.g., Coll. of Am. Pathologists v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 859, 867–68 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Home Health Care, Inc. v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 587, 589–91 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Szekely
v. Fla. Med. Ass’n, 517 F.2d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 1975); Rasulis v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d
1006, 1010 (7th Cir. 1974); Portland Adventist Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 1092,
1098 (D.D.C. 1983); Am. Med. Ass’n v. Mathews, 429 F. Supp. 1179, 1189–91, 1201–03
(N.D. Ill. 1977); see also Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F.
Supp. 125, 134 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (finding a law that established professional standards
physicians must meet to be compensated under Medicare or Medicaid did not interfere
with medical practice), aff’d mem., 423 U.S. 975 (1975).
231. See, e.g., Jeffrey P. Clemens & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Bargaining in the Shadow
of a Giant: Medicare’s Influence on Private Payment Systems (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
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B. Far-Reaching Federal Powers
The above examples of direct and indirect federal regulation contradict
the maxim that states are the sole, or primary, regulators of medical
practice. However, each of these examples was well within Congress’s
constitutional powers. In fact, the Constitution authorizes the federal
government to further extend its reach into medical practice.232 Congress
could exercise its commerce, spending, and taxing powers, among others,
to govern most—if not all—medical practice.
1. Commerce Powers
The Supreme Court has explained that the reach of the Commerce
Clause is broad.233 It authorizes Congress to regulate “the channels of
interstate commerce, persons or things in interstate commerce, and those
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”234 It is this third
category—activities that substantially affect interstate commerce—that
has enabled the federal government to regulate a wide range of seemingly
local activities, including intrastate sale of milk,235 growing wheat for one’s
own use,236 loan sharking,237 and growing marijuana for intrastate use.238
Given this reach, it is difficult to imagine a circumstance in which
medical practice does not substantially affect interstate commerce.239
First, medical practice is clearly a commercial activity that is part of an

Research, Working Paper No. w19503, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=233
6368 [http://perma.cc/X72J-YTA2].
232. Cf. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Food & Drug Admin., 484 F. Supp. 1179, 1187 (D.
Del. 1980) aff’d, 634 F.2d 106 (3d Cir. 1980) (“It is undisputed that the practice of
medicine is subject to the exercise of state police power . . . . But that assumption does
not imply an absence of federal jurisdiction . . . where the federal regulation constitutes a
reasonable exercise of a power vested in Congress under the Constitution.”).
233. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578–79
(2012).
234. Id. at 2578 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
235. See United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 121 (1942).
236. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942).
237. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971).
238. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005).
239. Cf. Noah, supra note 25, at 169 (arguing that modern medical practice is subject
to the federal government’s commerce powers); King, supra note 24, at 331 (explaining
that all eight circuit courts that have considered the issue have concluded that reproductive
clinics engage in interstate commerce).
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“economic enterprise.”240 In 2009, the most recent year for which the U.S.
Census Bureau has published data, the United States spent $1.7609 trillion
on medical services,241 which constituted approximately 12% of the U.S.
gross domestic product (GDP) that year.242 Second, modern medical practice
involves “concrete ties” to interstate commerce.243 Practitioners are often
part of large insurance networks or hospital chains that operate in multiple
states.244 Patients may travel across state lines for treatment, particularly
for innovative or specialist care,245 and practitioners may advertise to
attract out-of-state patients.246 Additionally, many health problems that
are affected by medical practice—such as prescription drug abuse, which
costs the United States an estimated $72 billion a year247—impact the
national economy. Based upon these facts, Congress would be justified in
finding that many, if not all, aspects of medical practice substantially affect
interstate commerce and therefore, in enacting a federal law regulating it.248
Congress has done just that. Relying on its commerce powers, Congress
has enacted laws that directly and indirectly regulate medical practice.249
Moreover, courts have recognized these laws as valid exercises of the
government’s commerce powers. For example, Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart, which upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion

240. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
241. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012
101 tbl.134 (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0134.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9J34-QY62].
242. This percentage was calculated based on the World Bank’s report that U.S. GDP
was $14.4179 trillion in 2009. World Development Indicators, WORLD DATABANK,
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx?isshared=true (last visited
Feb. 11, 2015). All health care spending amounted to approximately 18% of the U.S.
GDP. Health Expenditure, Total (% of GDP), WORLD DATABANK, http://data.world
bank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS [http://perma.cc/H6RS-7TDY] (last visited Feb.
11, 2015).
243. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
244. See Noah, supra note 25, at 169.
245. Id. at 170.
246. For example, the website for one of the largest U.S. fertility clinics, located in
Maryland, specifically welcomes patients from other states. World Class IVF and Egg Donor
Treatment For International and U.S. Patients, SHADY GROVE FERTILITY, http://www.shady
grovefertility.com/out_of_area [http://perma.cc/G49T-2XVA] (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).
247. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADDRESSING PRESCRIPTION DRUG
ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES 5 (2013)
[hereinafter HHS REPORT ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE], available at http://www.cdc.
gov/HomeandRecreationalSafety/pdf/HHS_Prescription_Drug_Abuse_Report_09.2013.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2CRZ-97C5].
248. Cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (noting that “under the Commerce Clause [the Court]
of course consider[s] legislative findings”).
249. See section III.1, supra.
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Ban Act, noted that Congress enacted the law under its commerce powers.250
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit upheld Federal Trade Commission regulations
governing the profession of optometry as within the federal government’s
commerce powers.251 Congress could go further by, for instance, restricting
off-label use of additional drugs.
It is also worth noting that the limits on Congress’s commerce powers
articulated in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius
do not apply to the argument that medical practice substantially affects
interstate commerce. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in National Federation
of Independent Businesses explained that the individual mandate in the
PPACA was not a permissible exercise of Congress’s commerce powers
because it compelled otherwise inactive individuals to become active in
commerce.252 But in the medical practice context, practitioners are already
active in commerce—in other words, there is “existing commercial activity”
to regulate.253 In sum, even if medical practice was once a local activity
outside the scope of Congress’s commerce powers, modern medical
practice substantially affects interstate commerce and thus, is within the
federal government’s reach.254

250. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 166 (2007). The law, by its own terms,
applies only to those physicians who are “in or affect [] interstate or foreign commerce.”
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2003). Justice Thomas, in his
concurring opinion joined by Justice Scalia, took care to note that “whether the Partial–
Birth Abortion Ban Act . . . constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress’ power under
the Commerce Clause is not before the Court.” Carhart, 550 U.S. at 169 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). This may suggest some skepticism, by at least Justices Thomas and Scalia,
that the commerce powers reach abortion procedures.
251. See Am. Optometric Ass’n v. FTC, 626 F.2d 896, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see
also LensCrafters, Inc. v. Wadley, 248 F. Supp. 2d 705, 729 (M.D. Tenn. 2003) (“[The
D.C. Circuit] has upheld federal regulations requiring optometrists to provide their patients
with copies of their prescriptions . . . thereby implicitly rejecting the argument that the
profession of optometry is exempt from federal commercial regulation.”).
252. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012).
253. Id. at 2587.
254. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992) (“As interstate
commerce has become ubiquitous, activities once considered purely local have come to
have effects on the national economy, and have accordingly come within the scope of
Congress’ commerce power.”).
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2. Spending Powers
The spending clause “provides Congress broad discretion to . . . spend
for the ‘general Welfare,’ including by funding particular . . . private
programs or activities,” and “[t]hat power includes the authority to impose
limits on the use of such funds to ensure they are used in the manner
Congress intends.”255 For example, in rejecting a First Amendment challenge
to regulations that prohibited practitioners who received federal familyplanning funds from discussing abortion with their patients, the Supreme
Court opined:
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a
program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest,
without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with
the problem in another way. In so doing, the Government . . . has merely chosen
to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.256

Because the federal government pays almost half of all health care
expenses in the United States,257 Congress’s spending powers provide an
avenue for regulating a significant amount of medical practice: selectively
funding medical services and placing conditions on those who receive
payments. Indeed, the federal government already exercises its spending
powers in this way. Federally-funded health care systems, such as the
Veterans Health Administration258 or the Indian Health Service,259 are clearly
controlled by the federal government. Additionally, as discussed above,
Medicare reimburses only those items and services that CMS determines
255. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321,
2327–28 (2013) (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 195 n.4 (1991); see also U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States . . . .”). Although Congress’s spending and taxing powers
come from the same clause of the Constitution, this Article addresses them separately for
clarity.
256. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. The majority opinion also rejected the argument that the
regulations violated a woman’s Fifth Amendment right to terminate her pregnancy,
reasoning that “Congress’ refusal to fund abortion counseling and advocacy leaves a
pregnant woman with the same choices as if the Government had chosen not to fund
family-planning services at all.” Id. at 202.
257. ORG. FOR ECON. DEV., OECD HEALTH STATISTICS 2014: HOW DOES THE UNITED
S TATES C OMPARE? 1, available at http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/Briefing-NoteUNITED-STATES-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/DTX8-445V].
258. See Veterans Health Administration, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFF.,
http://www.va.gov/health/ [http://perma.cc/FJ2U-CV35] (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). The
Veteran’s Health Administration is the largest health system in the United States,
“providing care to more than 8.3 million veterans per year.” Id.
259. See About HIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, INDIAN
HEALTH SERVICE, http://www.ihs.gov/aboutihs/ [http://perma.cc/R9XU-QH83] (last visited
Feb. 11, 2015).
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are “reasonable and necessary,”260 and the federal government places
limits on health care practitioners who receive Medicare and Medicaid funds.
For instance, a physician cannot refer Medicare and Medicaid patients to
other health care providers in which that physician has a financial interest.261
Here, like the commerce context, the federal government could go
further than it currently does. As an example, recent research suggests that
when pediatricians present vaccination as an option, rather than a foregone
conclusion, parents are more likely to decline recommended vaccinations
for their children.262 Research also indicates that many pediatricians
agree to parents’ requests to spread out recommended vaccines for their
children, despite concerns that spreading out vaccines puts the children
at risk for disease and is more painful for the children.263 Accordingly,
Congress might choose to fund programs to encourage childhood vaccination,
and prohibit participating practitioners from spreading out vaccinations, or
providing information about exemptions from state laws mandating
vaccination.264
To the extent the federal government offers funding to the states for
health-related programs, it might also reach medical practice by
“condition[ing] those offers on compliance with specified conditions.”265
In the wake of National Federation of Independent Businesses, in which
seven of the Court’s justices found that placing new conditions on the
existing level of federal funding for states’ Medicaid programs was
unconstitutionally coercive,266 scholars have suggested that the era in
which conditions on states’ receipt of federal funds were essentially
unchecked has ended.267 Yet, even with stronger limits on the federal
government’s ability to place conditions on state funds, the federal
government may be able reach certain aspects of medical practice. For
260. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395g (2012).
261. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012).
262. See Douglas J. Opel et al., The Architecture of Provider-Parent Vaccine Discussions
at Health Supervision Visits, 132 PEDIATRICS 1037, 1037 (2013).
263. See Allison Kempe et al., Physician Response to Parental Requests to Spread
Out the Recommended Vaccine Schedule, 135 PEDIATRICS 666, 666 (2015).
264. For an overview of state laws regarding vaccinations, see Immunization Managers,
Requirements and Laws, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.
gov/vaccines/imz-managers/laws/ [http://perma.cc/MFW8-ABCR] (last updated Feb. 3, 2015).
265. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012).
266. See id. at 2587.
267. See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet & Peter D. Jacobson, The Courts and Public Health:
Caught in a Pincer Movement, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 392, 394 (2014); Lynn A. Baker,
The Spending Power After NFIB v. Sebelius, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 72–73 (2014).
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example, to address prescription drug abuse, the federal government
might condition the receipt of new federal funds for Medicaid on states
establishing a database to track prescriptions for drugs of abuse, and
requiring practitioners to report prescriptions to the database.268
3. Taxing Powers
Congress’s taxing powers provide another avenue for influencing medical
practice. The federal government’s taxing powers, like its commerce and
spending powers, are quite broad. The taxing clause “gives the Federal
Government considerable influence even in areas where it cannot directly
regulate. The Federal Government may enact a tax on an activity that it
cannot authorize, forbid, or otherwise control.”269 The federal government
may impose taxes to “influence conduct,” as long as those taxes do not
become so punitive as to be penalties.270 Chief Justice John Roberts’s opinion
in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius—upholding
the PPACA’s individual mandate as a permissible exercise of Congress’s
taxing powers—made clear that “the breadth of Congress’s power to tax
is greater than its power to regulate commerce.”271
Congress has used its taxing powers in the past to control medical
practice. As an example, the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 imposed a yearly
tax on medical practitioners who compounded, dispensed, prescribed, or
administered marijuana,272 and was opposed by the AMA based on
concerns that the “prohibitive tax” would prevent physicians and pharmacists
from prescribing and dispensing the drug.273 Although the Controlled
Substances Act of 1970 repealed this law,274 there are other ways in which
the federal government might aim to influence various aspects of medical
practice through its taxing authority. The federal government might, for
instance, impose a tax on physicians with high prescription rates for
268. As of 2011, thirty-seven states had prescription drug monitoring programs
along these lines. See State Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
OFF. OF DIVERSION CONTROL, http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/faq/rx_monitor.htm#4
[http://perma.cc/Q3ZY-9M43] (last updated Oct. 2011).
269. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579.
270. Id. at 2599.
271. Id. at 2600.
272. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 551, 551–52 (1937).
273. Taxation of Marihuana: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 75th
Cong. 91 (1937) (statement of Dr. William C. Woodward, Legislative Counsel, American
Medical Association).
274. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-513, §§ 100-709, 84 Stat. 1236, 1281 (1970). The Marihuana Tax Act was repealed
after the Supreme Court held the law unconstitutional to the extent compliance with it
amounted to self-incrimination under state narcotic laws. See Leary v. United States, 395
U.S. 6, 28 1969).
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controlled substances, to address prescription drug abuse by discouraging
the over-prescription of such drugs.275
4. Other Sources of Power
In addition to exercising its commerce, spending, and taxing powers,
there are various other ways, somewhat different than the previous
examples, through which the federal government could, and does, directly
and indirectly influence certain realms of medical practice. As an example
of direct regulation, the federal government heavily regulates medical
practice in the military, directly restricting military practitioners’ autonomy
when necessary to further the goal of maintaining an effective fighting
force.276 If a practitioner were to disobey orders to provide particular
medical care, the practitioner could be punished, and that punishment likely
would be upheld as a valid exercise of the federal government’s military
powers.277
While the previous example demonstrates direct regulation of medical
practice, the federal government’s grants of certain patents, pursuant to
the Patent and Copyright Clause,278 represents indirect regulation of medical
practice. Patents can affect medical practice even though federal law explicitly
eliminates patent infringement remedies against medical practitioners
275. In fact, physicians who register with the DEA to prescribe controlled substances
already pay fees. See Registration Categories and Fees, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF
DIVERSION CONTROL, http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drugreg/categories.htm [http://perma.
cc/BWE4-J532]. Moreover, tracking physician-prescribing patterns would be feasible
because it is something that some drug companies already do. See Scott Glover & Lisa
Girion, OxyContin Maker Closely Guards Its List of Suspect Doctors, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
11, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/11/local/la-me-rx-purdue-20130811 [http://perma.
cc/658G-G2WM].
276. See Victor W. Sidel & Barry S. Levy, Physician-Soldier: A Moral Dilemma?,
in MILITARY MEDICAL ETHICS 293, 296 (Thomas E. Beam & Linette R. Sparacino eds.,
2003); Efthimios Parasidis, Justice and Beneficence in Military Medicine and Research,
73 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 792 (2012); Robert N. Strassfeld, The Vietnam War on Trial: The
Court-Martial of Dr. Howard B. Levy, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 839, 849 (1994).
277. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (authorizing the federal government “[t]o
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part
of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States”); Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733, 761 (1974) (upholding the court-martial of a military doctor who, among other
things, refused to provide medical training to soldiers); Gordon D. Henderson, CourtsMartial and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARV. L. REV. 293, 299–
300 (1957) (explaining that courts-martial predated the Constitution, but at least some
framers believed the militia clause authorized the continuation of courts-martial).
278. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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who infringe certain medical procedure patents.279 For example, to the
extent patents on medical products block the marketing of competitor
products,280 patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
much like the FDA’s gatekeeping, can determine the universe of treatments
that a medical practitioner may provide. As another example, patents on
genetic material have been used to prevent practitioners from providing
genetic testing services to their patients.281 Although a 2013 Supreme
Court decision invalidated one genetic testing company’s patents on “isolated
genes,” it upheld the company’s patents on another type of genetic
material—known as cDNA—and, until recently, the company continued
to pursue patent infringement claims against those offering genetic tests
arguably covered by these its patents.282 Likewise, insofar as medical
process patents cover patent-eligible subject matter, they have been used
to restrict the treatment options that practitioners can provide.283 Thus,
Congress’s commerce, spending, and taxing powers are not the only
means by which it can govern medical practice.
C. What to Make of the Existing Federal Oversight
Because the Constitution authorizes Congress to extensively regulate
medical practice, there is nothing unlawful about the examples of federal
oversight described in section III.A. Nevertheless, given the historical
resistance to various guises of federal oversight of medicine, such as

279. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c); Katherine J. Strandburg, Legal But Unacceptable:
Pallin v. Singer and Physician Patenting Norms, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE
EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 321, 321 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus & Jane C.
Ginsburg, eds. 2014).
280. See, e.g., Larry Husten, Medtronic to Pay Over $1 Billion to Settle Patent
Litigation with Edwards Lifesciences, FORBES.COM (May 20, 2014), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/larryhusten/2014/05/20/medtronic-to-pay-over-1billion-to-settle-patent-litigationwith-edwards-lifesciences/ [http://perma.cc/73MJ-WRGT] (describing a now settled patent
dispute between two medical device companies, which would have limited the availability
of certain medical devices in the United States).
281. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107, 2114 (2013).
282. See id. at 2119, 2120; Jacob S. Sherkow & Christopher Scott, Myriad Stands
Alone, 32 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 620, 620 (2014); Utah Court Dismisses Two More
BRCA Testing Patent Lawsuits Against Labcorp, Ambry, GENOMEWEB (Jan. 27, 2015),
available at https://www.genomeweb.com/business-news/utah-court-dismisses-two-morebrca-testing-patent-lawsuits-against-labcorp-ambry [https://perma.cc/3BVE-CNNM]; see
also In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774 F.3d 755
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that certain inventions that closely implicate the information
contained in genomic DNA are not patentable).
283. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302
(2012); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Medical-Process Patents—Monopolizing
the Delivery of Health Care, 355 N. ENG. J. MED. 2036, 2037–38 (2006).
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health care reform, and the traditional reliance on states to regulate medical
practice,284 these examples of federal regulation of medical practice raise
questions about why federal oversight was accepted—or established—in
these instances, and whether the current approach to federal regulation is
sensible.
Perhaps the most practical answer to the first question—why these
examples of federal oversight were accepted—is that, in many of the
instances in which the impact on medical practice was recognized, it was
also argued that that the law at issue did not, in fact, regulate medical
practice. In other words, it was argued that notwithstanding the ways that
these federal programs influence medicine, these federal programs are
consistent with the conventional view that states regulate medical practice.
For instance, in hearings before a Senate Subcommittee prior to the CSA’s
enactment, the director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
within the Department of Justice assured lawmakers that the CSA was “in
no way intended to authorize the Attorney General to regulate the practice
of medicine, nor will it have this effect.”285 Likewise, in hearings about
the 1962 amendments to the FDCA that authorized the FDA to review the
effectiveness of drugs, the AMA spokesperson’s concern that this new
authority would interfere with medical practice was characterized by
others speaking at the hearing as “specious.”286 The legislative history for
FDAAA suggests that Congress did not discuss the impact of REMS on
medical practice when enacting the law. But when the FDA implemented
regulations in 1992 to create “RiskMAPs”—risk mitigation programs that
were similar to REMS287—it responded to comments asserting that
RiskMAPs “interfere with the practice[] of medicine” by characterizing
the regulations as “permit[ing], in exceptional cases, approval of drugs
with restrictions so that the drugs may be available for prescribing and
dispensing,” rather than “interfering with physician or pharmacy practice.”288
And, as noted above, the Medicare statute includes a provision explicitly
disavowing any intent to regulate medical practice.289
284. See supra section II.
285. 1970 CSA Senate Hearing, supra note 171.
286. Harris, The Real Voice-II, supra note 196, at 146.
287. See, e.g., DRAFT REMS GUIDANCE, supra note 201, at 3–5.
288. New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated
Approval, 57 Fed. Reg. 58942, 58951–52 (Dec. 11, 1992) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts.
314 & 601), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2003-06-11/pdf/03-14621.pdf
[http://perma.cc/SZF7-E28P].
289. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2014).
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Denying that federal programs control medical practice may be politically
useful because of the history of state regulation and of opposition to
federal oversight. It gives Congress and administrative agencies cover
from opposition grounded in concern about federal, rather than state,
regulation, and allows them to make an argument that the particular
federal program at issue is consistent with the traditional division of labor
between the states and the federal government. But it also requires
lawmakers and administrative agencies to obfuscate the impact that these
federal laws have on medical practice. Transparency in governance is
considered to be “among the pantheon of great political virtues,”290 because
it facilitates democratic accountability and the better implementation of
laws.291 Obfuscating the federal government’s role in overseeing medicine
is, thus, undesirable, particularly at a time when the White House has
emphasized the value transparency in government.292 Moreover, the need
for rhetoric denying federal influence over medicine in areas that it exists
suggests that the current approach to federal oversight is not the most
sensible one.
In addition to the political explanation for why the federal government
was able to implement measures to influence medical practice in these
examples, another reason that the above examples of federal oversight
were established may be that Congress focused on issues that were—or
were perceived to be—of national concern. For example, Congress
prohibited off-label use of HGH after U.S.,293 and international,294 scandals
about athletes using performance-enhancing drugs sparked widespread
concern in the United States.295 At the time Congress enacted the PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act, more than half of states had already enacted laws

290. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 888 (2006).
While scholars have critiqued the concept of transparency and noted certain drawbacks
associated with the implementation of open government laws in the United States, such
critiques would not apply to this kind of obfuscation of the federal government’s role.
291. See, e.g., Robert G. Vaughn, Transparency in the Administration of Laws: The
Relationship Between Differing Justifications for Transparency and Differing Views of
Administrative Law, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 969, 970 (2011) (describing the justifications
for transparency).
292. See Transparency and Open Government: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009).
293. See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text.
294. See Tim Keeney, Ben Johnson: Is 1988 Olympics Scandal Biggest of All Time?,
BLEACHER REPORT (Oct. 9, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1365158-benjohnson-is-1988-olympics-scandal-biggest-of-all-time [http://perma.cc/52C3-DETV.
295. See, e.g., Abuse of Steroids in Amateur and Professional Athletics: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1990).
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attempting to ban partial-birth abortions,296 suggesting this procedure may
have been of national concern. Further, the enactment of the 1962 law
authorizing the FDA to review drugs’ efficacy followed a well-publicized
public health scare, when the FDA refused to approve a drug called
thalidomide that was later linked to severe birth defects, highlighting
drugs’ potential for affecting the nation’s public health.297
Although these federal efforts were aimed at problems of national interest,
the overall approach to federal oversight of medicine is haphazard. It may
be the case that the federal government only intervenes when issues of
national concern are at stake, but the federal government does not consistently
intervene in such circumstances, which leads to inconsistent and problematic
public health policy. The deadly 2012 outbreak of fungal meningitis that
was linked to the state-regulated practice of drug compounding, and the
enduring idea, even after the outbreak, that the federal government should
not regulate compounding that constitutes medical practice298 illustrates
that the federal government does not consistently step in to address medical
practice problems of national significance, and that the conventional view
on the appropriate role for the federal government can lead to questionable
public health policy.
In sum, both political rhetoric denying that federal laws interfere with
medical practice, and the national implications of the issues that federal
laws have addressed, likely enabled the federal government to establish
oversight of the areas of medical practice identified in the examples in this
section. But this approach to federal oversight of medicine is opaque and
lacks a coherent underlying principle, which leads to inconsistent and
problematic policy.
IV. WHEN FEDERAL REGULATION IS WARRANTED
Given that federal regulation of medicine already exists and is generally
lawful, but the scope of that federal oversight is currently inconsistently
and ineffectively defined, the question becomes one long debated in many
areas of U.S. policy: under what circumstances should the federal

296. See, e.g., Nancy Kubasek & Daniel Tagliarina, Failed Lessons of History: The
Predictable Shortcomings of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 159, 163 (2006).
297. See, e.g., DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL
IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 229–30, 238–40 (2010).
298. See supra notes 1–6 and 11–15 and accompanying text.
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government exert its authority?299 This Article proposes that federal regulation
of medical practice is warranted when medical practice causes or contributes
to a national public health problem that states cannot address.
A. The Case for Federal Regulation
Scholars and courts have attributed numerous merits to state-based
regulatory schemes,300 and scholars have identified a “general presumption
in favor of decentralization.”301 One common argument is that “state
governments limit the likelihood of federal tyranny.”302 Another is that,
similar to competition in private markets, competition between states for
“resident-taxpayers” may encourage states to provide optimal levels of
regulation.303 State regulation also may allow greater political participation.304
David L. Shapiro explained, “to the extent the electorate is small, and
elected representatives are thus more immediately accountable to individuals
and their concerns, government is brought closer to the people, and democratic
ideals are more fully realized.”305 Decentralized regulation may enable
experimentation and innovation, with the states functioning as “laboratories
for new ideas,”306 and accommodate cultural and local diversity that would
be threatened by national uniformity.307 In areas that have traditionally
299. Cf. Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-in Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1733,
1734 (2011) (“The constitutional dispute [about the PPACA] is part of a larger argument
that is perhaps America’s oldest: what is the proper role of the federal government?”).
300. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); Abigail R. Moncrieff,
Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National Action in Medical Malpractice Reform,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 844, 879 (2009).
301. Jonathan H. Adler, Cooperation, Commandeering, or Crowding Out?: Federal
Intervention and State Choices in Health Care Policy, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 199,
205 (2011); see also Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal
Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 536 (1997) (“My
starting point is a rebuttable presumption in favor of decentralization.”).
302. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 526
(1995); see also Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1500 (1987) (“The most important reason offered by the
defenders of state sovereignty was that state and local governments are better protectors
of liberty.”).
303. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; Moncrieff, supra note 300, at 869; Charles M.
Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418–20 (1956).
304. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; Chemerinsky, supra note 302, at 525; Barry
Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 389 (1997); Moncrieff, supra note
300, at 879–81.
305. DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 91–92 (1995).
306. Chemerinsky, supra note 302, at 525; McConnell, supra note 302, at 1499; see
also Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“[Decentralization] allows for more innovation and
experimentation in government . . . .”).
307. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; Friedman, supra note 304, at 401–02; McConnell,
supra note 302, at 1493.
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been regulated by states, continuing state regulation may retain the
expertise of the institutions that are most experienced, and provide
stakeholders predictability.308 Finally, there may be less partisan gridlock
at the state level than there currently is at the federal level, which may
enable state lawmakers to more quickly implement new laws and policies
than federal lawmakers can.
But scholars have also identified several advantages of federal regulation,
including addressing interstate issues that create externalities, providing
uniformity or coordination, preventing a “race to the bottom” among the
states that threatens public welfare, and providing greater resources or
expertise than the states possess. 309 The presumption in favor of
decentralization, thus, “can be overcome . . . by demonstrating the potential
benefits of federal intervention in a specific instance.”310 A federal
scheme need not deliver all possible benefits to be justified—one strong
merit may be sufficient to “tip” the scales in favor of federal regulation.311
And in the specific context of medical practice, there are several potential
benefits of federal regulation.
Despite the continuing narrative that medical practice is an individualized
and local endeavor,312 it can easily contribute to problems that cross state
boundaries and require nationally coordinated or uniform solutions.313
The fall 2012 outbreak of fungal meningitis, caused by drugs compounded
at a Massachusetts pharmacy that were shipped to patients in twenty-three
states, provides a vivid example.314 As early as April 2011, Colorado
recognized a problem with the pharmacy’s compounded drugs and
blocked sales of its products in the state.315 Even though Colorado notified
Massachusetts and the FDA, other states failed to take action to prevent
308. See Moncrieff, supra note 300, at 879–81.
309. See, e.g., Robert Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective
on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate
Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 594–600 (2008); Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of
Federalism, 45 CONN. L. REV. 217, 227 (2012).
310. Adler, supra note 301, at 205. Scholars have questioned whether state-based
regulatory schemes do, in fact, provide these benefits. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note
302, at 255.
311. See Stein, supra note 309, at 227.
312. See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text.
313. Cf. King, supra note 24, at 329 (describing the collective-action problem of the
states); McConnell, supra note 302, at 1500 (“Externalities present the principal
countervailing consideration in favor of centralized government . . . .”).
314. See, e.g., Outterson, DQSA, supra note 13, at 97.
315. See id.
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the pharmacy’s compounded drugs from reaching patients within their
borders—there was no coordinated response to the problem.316 Additionally,
the 2012 outbreak was not an isolated event; it might have been anticipated
by a well-coordinated national system. In 2013 researchers identified
eleven other similar outbreaks, between 2000 and the 2012 outbreak, caused
by sterile drugs compounded outside of hospital settings, eight of which
involved patients receiving compounded drugs across state lines.317
Interstate problems, and the need for national coordination or uniformity,
have prompted scholars and commentators to call for federal regulation of
various aspects of medical practice. For instance, Michael S. Young and
Rachel K. Alexander have argued that a federal medical licensing system
should be adopted because state licensure burdens practitioners “who
work in this . . . extremely mobile society, who travel interstate, who treat
patients from other states, or who participate in such activities as
telemedicine.”318 Abigail Moncrieff has called for federalizing the medical
malpractice system to correct for interstate externalities created by a
decentralized system.319 Scholars have also proposed federalizing health
systems that are currently decentralized, which would amount to increased
indirect federal regulation of medical practice to solve interstate problems.
Nicole Huberfeld, for example, has argued for federalizing Medicaid to
“create a more coherent, consistent, and equal program.”320
There are compelling public health reasons, in addition to the need to
address interstate problems, for federal schemes for medical practice.
Regulatory efforts that require significant scientific expertise may be
more efficiently and effectively carried out at the federal level. Jaime S.
King, for example, proposed federally regulating the use of assisted
reproductive technologies in part for this reason.321 It also may be desirable
316. See id.
317. See Catherine Staes et al., Description of Outbreaks of Health-Care Associated
Infections Related to Compounding Pharmacies, 2000–12, 70 AM. J. HEALTH-SYSTEM
PHARMACY e29, e30–31 (2013).
318. Michael S. Young & Rachel K. Alexander, Recognizing the Nature of American
Medical Practice: An Argument for Adopting Federal Medical Licensure, 13 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 145, 166–67 (2010); see also George Annas, Congress, Controlled
Substances, and Physician-Assisted Suicide—Elephants in Mouseholes, 354 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1079–1084 (2006) (opining that state licensure of medical practitioners is a “relic”).
Other scholars, however, have argued for improving coordination between the states rather
than federalizing medical licensure. See, e.g., Kocher et al., supra note 131 (“We believe
that . . . states should adopt mutual recognition agreements in which they honor each
other’s physician licenses.”).
319. See Moncrieff, supra note 300, at 847–48.
320. Huberfeld, supra note 53, at 473.
321. See King, supra note 24, at 329, 338; see also Heled, supra note 24, at 304–07
(making recommendations for the FDA regulation of the genetic aspects of donated reproductive
tissue).
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to federally govern certain aspects of medical practice to ensure a minimum
level of protection for the public health and patients’ safety.322 Perhaps in
recognition of this possibility, Rebecca Dresser and Joel Frader argued
Congress and the FDA should take a “more affirmative” role in overseeing
off-label uses of drugs to prevent harm.323 Lastly, the federal government
has greater financial resources than the states do, which permits the federal
government to make longer-term investments and establish broader regulatory
schemes than the states can.324 National public health problems may
require the financial resources of the federal government and the long-term
commitment those resources enable. As technology and scientific
understanding advance, it may become increasingly likely that solutions
to public health problems will outstrip states’ abilities and resources. Federal
resources might be used to establish federal initiatives that directly regulate
medical practice or, if direct federal control is not needed, might be given
to the states, with conditions intended to influence medical practice.
In fact, in many cases, federal oversight of medical practice need not
wholly supplant state regulation to gain the benefits of federal oversight.
It is true that for certain problems a single, uniform policy will be necessary
or useful, and, accordingly it may be desirable to establish federal oversight
that preempts divergent state oversight in those circumstances. For example,
permitting individual states to make independent approval decisions about
medical products could undermine the FDA’s ability to protect and
promote the public health, and create uncertainty for industry stakeholders
that invest in and develop new medical products.325 But in many cases,
even when a national public health problem has emerged, a wholesale
federal takeover of medical practice regulation may not be necessary—
overlapping authorities can be beneficial, and regulators can learn from

322. See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 301, at 544; cf. Noah, supra note 25, at 154 (“[T]he
federal government should not feel shy about interfering with the practice of medicine . . .
to ensure patient safety.”).
323. Dresser & Frader, supra note 45, at 483. Philip M. Rosoff and Doriane
Lambelet Coleman have also proposed heightened regulation of off-label prescribing, but
remain agnostic as to whether such regulation should be federal. See Philip M. Rosoff &
Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Case for Legal Regulation of Physicians’ Off-Label
Prescribing, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 690–91 (2011).
324. See Sage & Hyman, supra note 24, at 823.
325. Cf. Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696, at *2 (D.
Mass. Apr. 15, 2014) (enjoining a Massachusetts banon a FDA-approved drug—which
was framed as a medical practice law— because it was preempted by the FDCA).
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each other’s’ experiences.326 In sum, federally regulating medical practice—
either directly and indirectly—may offer comparative advantages over
sole state regulation for interstate problems, problems that may require
greater resources and scientific expertise than states can offer, and areas
in which ensuring a minimum level of protection for patients and the
public health is particularly important.
B. A Public Health Framework for Federal Regulation
Rather than considering the merits of federalizing a particular aspect of
medical practice oversight, this Article proposes that federal regulation is
generally warranted when medical practice causes or contributes to a
national public health problem that the states cannot address. Because
public health problems, by definition, occur on a community or population
level,327 coordinated, federal efforts are likely necessary to effectively address
national public health problems. However, when the states have already
established essentially consistent and well-functioning schemes to regulate
areas of medical practice that implicate the national public health, there
may be no need for the federal government to intervene. Additionally,
depending on the particular problem, federal oversight need not preempt
all state oversight. By limiting the proposal to circumstances in which
there is both a national public health concern and a lack of adequate state
oversight, this framework attempts to strike the right balance between
expanding federal options for addressing public health problems, avoiding
ineffective federal interference with medical practice, and preserving
well-functioning state regulation consistent with federalism values.
Additionally, by focusing on national issues, this proposal is consistent
with, although not identical to, the circumstances in which the federal
government has been able to implement medical practice regulation.328
Considering whether the six examples of federal medical practice regulation
provided in section III.A would be warranted under this framework helps to
clarify it. The CSA, the FDA’s pre-market review of medical products
and REMS requirements, and Medicare coverage decisions would all be
warranted federal regulatory schemes under this framework. In determining
whether a particular law is intended to address a national public health
problem, it is helpful to consider Congressional intent, as well as public
health agencies’ positions on the problem addressed by the law. Congress
established each of these regulatory schemes, at least in part, to address a
national public health problem, and agencies have endorsed the public health
326.
327.
328.
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nature of these schemes.329 The CSA and the FDA’s pre-market review
of medical products and REMS requirements, by virtue of addressing
scientifically complex problems associated with products that cross state
lines, address problems that states are unlikely to effectively regulate.
Likewise, states do not possess sufficient resources for a program like
Medicare, and to administer such a program, the federal government must
make coverage decisions.
The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act and the provision prohibiting offlabel use of HGH, on the other hand, would not be appropriate exercises
of federal authority because neither law was enacted to address a national
public health problem. The Congressional findings in the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act suggest that Congress enacted the law to “express[]
respect for the dignity of human life,” and protect the medical profession
from reputational harms associated with performing what Congress deemed
a “gruesome” procedure, rather than to address a public health concern
about the safety or effectiveness of the procedure itself.330 Similarly, to
the extent that Congress prohibited off-label use of HGH to address cheating
in sports, rather than to solve a public health problem, that prohibition is
an unwarranted exercise of federal authority.331 When regulation hinges
on particular values for which there is no compelling public health need
for national uniformity, rather than on addressing public health problems,
states might be better positioned to account for cultural and local diversity
in views.
1. Advantages of the Framework
This framework offers several advantages. First, the position that the
federal government does not regulate medical practice is simply incorrect,

329. See, e.g., Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, 1236, 1242 (identifying the prevention of drug abuse as one
purpose of the Act, which includes the CSA); OBERLANDER, supra note 47, at 17–35 (describing
Medicare’s goal to bring medical care for the elderly into the mainstream); Psaty & Korn,
supra note 201, at 2185 (explaining the public health rationale for enacting the REMS
provisions); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., What We Do, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/
aboutfda/whatwedo/ [http://perma.cc/MVV8-D996] (“FDA is responsible for protecting
the public health by assuring the safety, efficacy and security of human . . . drugs, biological
products, medical devices . . . .”).
330. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105 § 2(14)(J), 117
Stat. 1201, 1205; Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007).
331. See supra notes 159–61 and accompanying text.
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and the distinction between regulating medical practice and medical
products is porous. The CSA, the provision in the FDCA prohibiting offlabel use of HGH, the FDA’s premarket review of medical products, and
FDA-required REMS are all examples of medical product regulation that
also reaches medical practice.332 To the extent arguments against federal
regulation are premised on the notion that the federal government plays
no role—or historically has never played a role—in regulating medical
practice, those arguments are demonstrably wrong. Dispensing with the
truism that the federal government abstains from regulating medical
practice for a framework that explicitly acknowledges the role that the
federal government plays will permit more transparency about that role.
Additionally, by proposing a general framework to guide decisions about
when to exert federal authority over medical practice, this framework
should promote a more principled approach to federal oversight.
Second, this framework ought not to run afoul of traditional notions of
federalism. While some may oppose this framework on the ideological
ground that greater federal power is inherently bad,333 state regulation of
medical practice arose at a time when medical practice was decidedly
local in nature—which is no longer the case.334 “Federalism is rooted in
the belief that issues that are not national in scope or significance are most
appropriately addressed by the level of government closest to the
people.”335 But “Our Federalism” does not require absolute deference to
states’ authority; instead, it envisions a role for the federal government in
solving national problems.336 By limiting federal intervention to activities
causing or contributing to a national public health problem that states are
not equipped to address, the federal role conceived by this framework is
consistent with “Our Federalism.” It recognizes the comparative advantages
that states may have in some circumstances, and does not call for federal
preemption of all medical practice oversight, even in situations in which
medical practice contributes to a national public health problem. For
example, while a federal review of the safety and effectiveness of infertility
treatments and practices, such as in vitro fertilization (IVF) techniques,
would likely be more efficient and expert than duplicative state efforts,337

332. See discussion in sections III.A.1.a and b, and 2.a and b.
333. Cf. Huberfeld, supra note 53, at 435 (“[S]ome would oppose centralization [of
Medicaid] on the ideological grounds that more federal government power is bad, and
more state or local power is good.”).
334. See, e.g., MOHR, supra note 23, at 9–21.
335. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999).
336. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). As Nicole Huberfeld explains,
“Justice Black coined the phrase ‘Our Federalism’ in this case.” Huberfeld, supra note
53, at 454 n.112.
337. See King, supra note 24, at 329–31, 338.
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there may good reasons why certain practices differ among states. Some
states offer insurance coverage for infertility treatment, while others do
not,338 and differences in insurance coverage may drive practitioners and
patients to make different decisions about treatment, such as determining
how many embryos to implant in a woman undergoing IVF. Accordingly,
while the federal government may be best able to regulate certain aspects
of infertility treatments, states may have comparative advantages in
regulating other aspects.
Finally, insofar as the argument that the federal government should not
regulate medical practice has limited the options that federal lawmakers
seriously consider, this framework should open new possibilities for
federal legal action to address serious public health problems. As an
example, Congress expressed concern about intruding on state regulation
of traditional drug compounding through the Drug Quality and Security
Act, and that concern, arguably, drove Congress to provide more limited
federal oversight of compounding than it could have in the Act.339 Under
this framework, however, federally regulating drug compounding—regardless
of whether it constitutes medical practice—would be considered appropriate
because it contributes to a national public health problem that states cannot
address.
2. Addressing Critiques
Although the proposed framework offers advantages, it may also be
susceptible to several critiques. First, proposing that the federal government
regulate only those activities that cause or contribute to a national public
health problem that states cannot address might trade one line-drawing
problem for another. While the line between regulating medical practice
versus medical products is not readily apparent, some scholars have criticized
the notion of distinguishing between individual and public health,340 and
it may be difficult to determine what constitutes a national public health
problem versus a local or individual health problem. It is likely to be even
more challenging to determine what is both a national public health problem
and a problem that the states cannot address. This framework, thus, will
be most helpful at two ends of a spectrum—when it is very clear there is
338. See State Infertility Insurance Laws, AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., http://www.
asrm.org/insurance.aspx [http://perma.cc/JQ92-LL23] (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).
339. See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text.
340. See, e.g., GOSTIN, supra note 49, at 3–4; Arah, supra note 49, at 235.
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a national public health problem that states cannot address, and when it is
very clear those circumstances do not exist. But determining what constitutes
a national problem for which state regulation will be inadequate is a
question we routinely trust to Congress and administrative agencies in
contexts other than medicine.341 Consequently, this framework tasks
Congress and administrative agencies with an inquiry that is within their
institutional expertise. Because line-drawing problems are difficult, if not
impossible, to completely eradicate, focusing Congress and administrative
agencies’ attention on inquiries within their institutional expertise, and
providing them with principled bases on which to make their decisions,
may be the most viable solution.
Second, there may be concerns that acknowledging and, in some
circumstances, expanding a federal role in overseeing medical practice
will lead to the government curtailing individual liberties in the name of
public health. It is true that there is a history of governments using, or
trying to use, public health authorities in this way. For example, in the
early- and mid-twentieth century, a majority of states passed laws permitting
or mandating the sterilization of mentally ill persons, or other persons
deemed “socially inadequate.”342 In the early 1990s, when mortality from
HIV/AIDS was rising and treatment options were very limited, Senator
Jesse Helms proposed requiring medical practitioners to be tested for HIV
and criminalizing the practice of medicine by HIV positive individuals.343
More recently, in the name of preventing the transmission of Ebola, local
schools implemented policies that excluded children who, according to
the CDC, were not at a high enough risk to merit exclusion.344 Although
the framework proposed in this Article will not eliminate the possibility
that civil liberties will be curtailed in the name of the public health, the
risk of such abuses already exists under the current framework.345 To the

341. Cf. Abbe R. Gluck, Our (National) Federalism, 123 YALE L. J. 1996, 1998
(2014) (describing Congress’s role and noting “federalism now comes from federal
statutes”); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567,
570 (2011) (“Critical decisions about the actual scope of state powers and autonomy will
be made not in Congress or in the courts, but in the halls of agencies . . . .”).
342. See PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL ix–xiv (2008); Paul A. Lombardo, Public Health or
AIDS Hysteria? Helms’s Proposal, BIOLAW, Dec. 1991, at S:681, S:683 [hereinafter
Lombardo, Public Health or AIDS Hysteria?].
343. See Lombardo, Public Health or AIDS Hysteria?, supra note 337, at S:681.
344. See, e.g., Wendy Hensel, Civil Rights Have a Place in Conversation, ATLANTA
J. CONST., Nov. 21, 2014, at A16.
345. See, e.g., supra notes 342–44 and accompanying text. In addition, depending
on one’s view of abortion, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act may serve as evidence of
the federal government curtailing individual liberties in the name of medical practice
regulation, rather than in the name of public health.
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extent the proposed framework enables an expansion of federal oversight
of medical practice, it is not clear that the federal government is more
prone to these abuses than state governments are. Moreover, similar to
line-drawing problems, governments using public health authorities to
curtail civil liberties may be a particularly difficult problem to eradicate.
The framework proposed in this Article does not seem likely to exacerbate
the problem—as its purpose is not to expand federal regulation per se, but
rather to make that regulation more transparent and coherent.
Third, federal regulation under the framework proposed in this Article
may restrict medical practitioners’ flexibility, as well as stifle policy
experimentation by state governments.346 The framework is likely to limit
medical practitioners’ discretion in clinically meaningful ways by requiring
that, in certain circumstances, care be provided to patients not based on a
practitioner’s judgment about that individual patient’s best interests, but
instead based on a public health policy goal. As an example, the DEA’s
existing scheme for regulating pain medication has been criticized for
making it difficult for practitioners to treat individual patients with legitimate
needs for such drugs, in the name of addressing the prescription drug abuse
problem.347 However, that regulation under the framework proposed in
this Article might result in patients receiving non-individualized, or even
suboptimal, care in certain circumstances should not necessarily weigh
against implementing it. The framework would change clinical practice
only in those circumstances in which a judgment has been made that the
public health should be prioritized over an individual’s health.348 Indeed,
courts and scholars have recognized that individual interests may be
restrained when “the safety of the general public” demands it.349 Likewise,

346. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 302, at 525; McConnell, supra note 302, at
1499.
347. See, e.g., Ballantyne, supra note 21, at 812.
348. Moreover, the interests of the public health and the interests of the individual
patient may be aligned in certain situations. For example, prescribing an antibiotic for a
patient that has a viral condition benefits neither the individual patient nor the public
health. See section IV.C.1.a., infra.
349. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 25 S. Ct. 358, 362 (1905); see, e.g., James F. Childress
et al., Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 170, 171–72
(2002); Wendy E. Parmet, Valuing the Unidentified: The Potential of Public Health Law,
53 JURIMETRICS J. 255, 265 (2013).
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when state experimentation leads to a “race to the bottom” that threatens
the public health, it would be reasonable to limit such experimentation.350
Related to concerns about federal regulation of medical practice
prioritizing public health over individual health, there might be concerns
about supplanting medical practitioners’ expert judgments with those of
federal lawmakers.351 In other words, there might be concerns that this
framework will permit federal lawmakers to establish unwise medical
policies that will be difficult to modify. But in certain instances, federal
actors may be better positioned than individual practitioners, professional
organizations, or state governments to detect problems arising from
medical practice and determine appropriate policies to address such
problems. The FDA’s authority to require REMS offers an example.
Risks associated with certain uses of drugs, and plans to mitigate those
risks, may require the comprehensive data and scientific expertise of the
FDA. Additionally, even if this framework enables the federal government’s
role to expand over time, a federal regulatory scheme would not necessarily
lead to more interference with practitioner discretion than a state-based
scheme—because states can also exert substantial control over many
aspects of medical practice.352
Fourth, because federal authorities are more distant than state authorities,
enforcing federal medical practice requirements may be challenging.353
There is some evidence that existing efforts to federally regulate medical
practice currently face enforcement problems. As an example, some
commentators estimate that thirty percent of prescriptions for HGH are
off-label, despite the prohibition on such prescriptions.354 Questions also
have been raised about whether the FDA can effectively enforce REMS
requirements.355 Although federal enforcement difficulties certainly exist,
it is not clear that federal authorities have worse enforcement records than
state authorities with more limited resources. Additionally, federal
requirements may have an expressive value that a patchwork of state laws
does not. Especially because federal oversight of medical practice is
considered unusual, federally regulating a particular area of medical practice

350. Cf. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 309, at 597–98 (describing the “race to the
bottom” phenomenon in the context of climate change policy).
351. See, e.g., Gottlieb, supra note 149.
352. See id.
353. Cf. Sage & Hyman, supra note 24, at 823; McConnell, supra note 302, at 1508.
354. See, e.g., Mary Lee Vance, Can Growth Hormone Prevent Aging?, 348 N. ENG.
J. MED. 779, 780 (2003).
355. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FDA
L ACKS C OMPREHENSIVE D ATA T O D ETERMINE WHETHER R ISK E VALUATION AND
MITIGATION STRATEGIES IMPROVE DRUG SAFETY 22 (2013), available at https://oig.hhs.
gov/oei/reports/oei-04-11-00510.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6X5-NHH5].
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may underscore that area’s importance to the public health, educate
practitioners and patients about its importance, and help shift social norms.356
Finally, instead of acknowledging a federal role in regulating medical
practice, one might propose eliminating existing areas of federal oversight
to preserve state primacy in regulating medical practice. That solution,
however, is not only impractical—it would be politically impossible to
dissolve many federal health programs such as Medicare357—it would
have disastrous public health effects. It, for example, would require
dismantling modern FDA regulation of medical products, and reverting
to an era of widespread marketing of fraudulent or adulterated drugs and
devices.358 As a series of articles in The New Yorker reported, before the
FDA was authorized to review drugs’ effectiveness in 1962, “it was
frequently impossible for even a specialist to find out what a given drug
might do for a patient,” a number of drugs “had little efficacy at all,” “a
good part of the advertising was misleading—in fact, [] some of it was
downright fraudulent,” and it took the government “ten years to ban
Hoxey’s Cancer Cure—a worthless concoction that sick people spent
three to four hundred dollars per treatment for, when they might have been
saved by surgery or X-ray therapy.”359
C. Applying the Framework: Antibiotic Resistance
As discussed above, this Article proposes that the federal government
should regulate medical practice when it causes or contributes to a national
public health problem that the states cannot address. To illustrate how this
framework could work in practice and open new options for addressing
public health crises, this section discusses one example for which the
framework would clearly support federal regulation: the problem of
antibiotic resistance.360 This section first argues that medical practice that

356. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2028 (1996) (describing various expressive values of law).
357. See Moncrieff, supra note 300, at 882–83.
358. Cf. CARPENTER, supra note 297, at 73–118 (describing the drug market before
the enactment of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938).
359. Richard Harris, The Annals of Legislation: The Real Voice-I, THE NEW YORKER,
Mar. 14, 1964, at 63–64; Richard Harris, The Annals of Legislation: The Real Voice-III,
THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 28, 1964, at 50.
360. The problem is also characterized more broadly as antimicrobial resistance
because, in addition to bacteria, other microbes—fungi, viruses, and parasites—have
developed resistance to existing drugs. See, e.g., About Antimicrobial Resistance: A Brief
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contributes to antibiotic resistance is an appropriate candidate for federal
regulation, and second considers how federal regulation might be
implemented.
1. Antibiotic Resistance Fits the Framework
Medical practice that contributes to antibiotic resistance is an appropriate
target for federal regulation because antibiotic resistance represents a
serious threat to the national public health that the states cannot effectively
address.
a. The National Antibiotic Resistance Problem
Congress and major public health organizations have recognized drugresistant bacteria as a grave national—and international—public health
problem.361 The CDC reports that each year at least 2 million people in
the United States are infected with drug-resistant bacteria, 23,000 die as a
direct result of those infections, and many more die from conditions that
are complicated by the infections.362 The World Economic Forum estimates
that 80,000 people in China, and 25,000 people in Europe, die each year
from hospital-acquired infections with drug-resistant bacteria.363 And the
World Health Organization (WHO) reports “very high rates” of antibiotic
resistance worldwide.364
There is good reason to be concerned about antibiotic resistant bacteria.
Antibiotics provide treatments for infections that are serious and lifethreatening, such as sepsis, as well as common illnesses, such as strep
throat, that are generally viewed as low risk but were untreatable and

Overview, C ENTERS FOR D ISEASE C ONTROL & P REVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/
drugresistance/about.html [http://perma.cc/DM5Z-RMTZ] (last updated Sept. 16, 2013).
361. See, e.g., 158 CONG. REC. S4610-30 (daily ed. June 26, 2012) (statement of Sen.
Mikulski); WORLD HEALTH ORG., ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: GLOBAL REPORT ON
S URVEILLANCE 2014 9–30 (2014) [hereinafter WHO R EPORT ], available at http://
apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/112642/1/9789241564748_eng.pdf?ua=1 [http://perma.cc/
3SHU-88EH]; CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE
THREATS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013 11 (2013) [hereinafter CDC REPORT], available at
http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/threat-report-2013/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf [http://perma.
cc/T9NG-4HZ5]; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: THE JUDICIOUS
USE OF MEDICALLY IMPORTANT ANTIMICROBIAL DRUGS IN FOOD-PRODUCING ANIMALS 3
(Apr. 13, 2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/animal veterinary/guidance
complianceenforcement/guidanceforindustry/ucm216936.pdf [http://perma.cc/4ZP2-EWFL].
362. CDC REPORT, supra note 361, at 11.
363. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL RISKS 30 (8th ed. 2013) [hereinafter WEF
REPORT], available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2013.pdf
[http://perma.cc/JZ2R-VNYR].
364. WHO REPORT, supra note 361, at x.
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sometimes fatal before antibiotics were developed.365 Antibiotics also
enable treatments for conditions other than infections. For example,
chemotherapy and surgery pose infection risks, and would be substantially
more dangerous without effective antibiotics.366 The threat of antibiotic
resistance, thus, is not just that we will lose the ability to treat infections,
but also that we will lose the capacity to safely treat many other diseases
and conditions. Indeed, the CDC concluded that the consequences of
failing to act to stop the spread of drug-resistant bacteria are “potentially
catastrophic,”367 the World Economic Forum cited drug-resistant bacteria
as “arguably the greatest risk . . . to human health,”368 and the DirectorGeneral of the WHO said “[a] post-antibiotic era means, in effect, an end
to modern medicine as we know it.”369
Antibiotic resistance arises because bacteria are living organisms that
evolve and adapt to survive in their environments.370 Although any use of
antibiotics selects for resistant bacteria by killing those that are not, misuse
unnecessarily exacerbates this effect.371 Antibiotic misuse includes using
antibiotics to promote animal growth.372 It also includes the medical use
of antibiotics at doses too low to effectively cure an infection, for conditions
that will not respond to antibiotics such as viral conditions, or for lengths

365. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in Public Health,
1900-1999: Control of Infectious Diseases, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 621
(July 30, 1999), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4829a1.htm [http://perma.
cc/GGN5-K5UM].
366. See, e.g., WEF REPORT, supra note 363, at 30; CDC REPORT, supra note 361, at 24.
367. CDC REPORT, supra note 361, at 6.
368. WEF REPORT, supra note 363, at 28.
369. Id. at 29.
370. See Antimicrobial (Drug) Resistance, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NAT’L INST. OF
ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE, http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/antimicrobialresistance/
understanding/pages/causes.aspx [http://perma.cc/SER6-EG42] (last updated Dec. 21, 2011).
371. See Brad Spellberg et al., The Future of Antibiotics and Resistance, 368 NEW.
ENG. J. MED. 299, 299–300 (2013).
372. Because using antibiotics in livestock feed does not involve medical practice, it
is beyond the scope of this Article. It does, however, play a significant role in contributing
to the antibiotic resistance problem. See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PHASING
OUT CERTAIN ANTIBIOTIC USE IN FARM ANIMALS (2013), available at http://www.fda.
gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/UCM378197.pdf [http://perma.cc/269UCW5E] (discussing a voluntary plan to phase out the use of certain antibiotics in farm
animals in an effort to slow down antimicrobial resistance).
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of time shorter or longer than necessary to cure an infection.373 Even
without exposure to antibiotics, some level of resistance will occur in
nature.374 In 2012, scientists reported finding drug resistance in bacteria,
including resistance to synthetic antibiotics not created until the twentieth
century, in a cave that had been isolated from the surface for at least four
million years,.375
Antibiotic resistance is fundamentally a national and international problem,
both in scope and significance.376 Antibiotic-resistant bacteria can quickly
and easily spread across state and national boundaries.377 For example,
drug-resistant gonorrhea was first identified in Hawaii and California in
the late 1990s and early 2000s, but had spread throughout the United
States by 2007.378 Behaviors that may seem local in nature, such as
unprotected sexual activity, or more relevant to this Article, practitioners’
antibiotic prescribing decisions, can contribute to the development of
antibiotic resistant bacteria capable of crossing state lines.379 In addition,
such infections cost a tremendous amount of money. The CDC estimates
that drug-resistant infections cost the United States as much as $20 billion
in direct health care expenses, and $35 billion in lost productivity.380
b. States Cannot Adequately Address the Problem
Although a number of states have enacted laws intended to address
medical practice that contributes to antibiotic resistance, state efforts are
likely insufficient.381 State laws primarily focus on tracking infections.
373. See CDC REPORT, supra note 361, at 41–43; Aaron S. Kesselheim & Kevin
Outterson, Fighting Antibiotic Resistance: Marrying New Financial Incentives, 29 HEALTH
AFF. 1689, 1690 (2010).
374. See Spellberg et al., supra note 371, at 300.
375. See Kirandeep Bhullar et al., Antibiotic Resistance Is Prevalent in an Isolated
Cave Microbiome, PLOS ONE, Apr. 2012, at 2.
376. Although the problem is not confined to the United States, this Article focuses
on the United States to illustrate how the framework for federally regulating medical practice
could work in this country.
377. See, e.g., CDC REPORT, supra note 361, at 11; Sage & Hyman, supra note 24,
at 824.
378. See, e.g., Lauren F. Friedman, Super Gonorrhea Is on the Rise in the United
States, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 12, 2014, 1:14 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/cipro
floxacin-resistance-and-gonorrhea-incidence-2014-3#ixzz2vlzm8jzU [http://perma.cc/FC287UNW].
379. See CDC REPORT, supra note 361, at 41–43.
380. See id. at 11. Likewise, the WHO reports that the international economic effects
of antibiotic resistance are “disturbing.” WHO REPORT, supra note 361, at xix. Ten years
ago, antibiotic resistance was projected “to cause a fall in real gross domestic product
(GDP) of 0.4% to 1.6%, which translates into many billions of today’s dollars globally.”
Id.
381. See Sage & Hyman, supra note 24, at 824.

492

ZETTLER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 52: 427, 2015]

7/27/2015 1:55 PM

Federal Oversight of Medicine
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

All fifty states require that certain diseases be reported to the state,382 with
some requiring reporting of particular infections with antibiotic-resistant
organisms. For example, Arkansas requires that practitioners report
infections with Vancomycin-resistant enterococci.383 States may voluntarily
report such disease cases to the CDC for national aggregation and
monitoring.384
In addition to mandating reporting, several states have enacted laws
explicitly aimed at preventing the spread of methicillin resistant staphylococcus
aureus (MRSA) or Multi-Drug Resistant Organisms (MDROs).385 The
laws generally require that hospitals screen patients at risk for contracting
MRSA or MDROs, and if a patient is infected, take steps to prevent the
infection’s spread, such as isolating the patient and ensuring that hospital
staff practice appropriate hygiene like hand washing.386 Although these
requirements apply to hospitals, they indirectly regulate practitioner behaviors
that contribute to the spread of drug-resistant bacteria.
States efforts, however, have not included comprehensive laws to
incentivize or require appropriate antibiotic prescribing.387 This gap is

382. See, e.g. National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS), Data
Collection and Reporting, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://wwwn.
cdc.gov/nndss/script/DataCollection.aspx [http://perma.cc/E4VW-E6HQ] [hereinafter NNDSS].
383. See Arkansas Department of Health (ADH) Mandatory Reportable Diseases List
and Instructions, ARK. DEP’T OF HEALTH (Sept. 1, 2014), available at http://www.
healthy.arkansas.gov/programsServices/epidemiology/Documents/ReportableDisease.pdf
[http://perma.cc/J27Z-YHEJ]. Vancomycin is an important hospital-based antibiotic, and
infections with vancomycin-resistant enterococci are associated with increased mortality.
See, e.g., Establishing a List of Qualifying Pathogens Under the Food and Drug
Administration Safety and Innovation Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 35155, 35162 (proposed June 12,
2013); Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Resistance: The Role of Antibiotic
Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 613, 626 (2010).
384. See NNDSS, supra note 382.
385. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1255.8 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 19a-490p (West 2010); 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 330/7 (West 2013); 410 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/10 (West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.585 (West 2010); 40 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 1303.403 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-269 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 70.41.430 (West 2011).
386. See e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1255.8 (West 2014),
387. Arizona restricts how optometrists, but not physicians, prescribe antibiotics.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1706 (2010). In addition, a few states where Lyme disease is
prevalent have expressly permitted licensed physicians to prescribe long-term antibiotic
therapy for patients diagnosed with Lyme disease, suggesting that physicians in those
states may have been subject to—or worried about—disciplinary actions from state medical
boards for prescribing long-term courses of antibiotics. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-
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troubling because as many as fifty percent of antibiotics used in the United
States are used inappropriately.388 With the pipeline for new antibiotics
dwindling because antibiotics offer a lower return on investment than other
classes of drugs, some have expressed concern that any limits on antibiotic
prescribing—at the federal or state level—might reduce the potential
profits that companies can hope to reap, leading to a further diminished
antibiotic pipeline.389 There are, however, ways to address this concern
that do not depend on increasing antibiotic sales by permitting dubious
uses. For example, this tension between the need to both incentivize
antibiotic development and curtail inappropriate antibiotic uses might be
resolved by de-linking antibiotic profits from antibiotic sales volume, as
Kevin Outterson has proposed.390 Concerns about the antibiotic pipeline,
therefore, do not support a permissive policy with respect to practitioners’
antibiotic prescribing decisions. There may also be concerns that federal
laws or regulations governing antibiotic prescribing decisions will not
account for legitimate clinical exceptions to general prescribing rules. It,
however, may be possible to design laws or regulations with sufficient
flexibility to allow for clinically important exceptions, or it may be worth
accepting some risk that a few individual patients will receive suboptimal
care to promote the public health through better antibiotic prescribing
practices overall.
In short, the existing, and incomplete, patchwork of state laws has not
halted the spread of drug-resistant bacteria. While legal efforts to regulate
practitioners’ behaviors that contribute to resistance will not eliminate
resistance, for such efforts to be most effective they must be nationally
coordinated, and backed by resources that will enable long-term policies.391
Thus, the states are not likely to effectively regulate medical practice that
contributes to antibiotic resistance. Additionally, professional self-regulation
does not seem to be effectively addressing practitioner behaviors that
contribute to resistance. For example, twenty-six organizations, including
the American Academy of Pediatrics and the Infectious Diseases Society of
America (IDSA), which represents health care professionals who specialize

14m (West 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12DD (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 5-37.5-4 (West 2008).
388. See CDC REPORT, supra note 361, at 11.
389. See, e.g., Richard P. Wenzel, The Antibiotic Pipeline—Challenges, Costs, and
Values, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 523 (2004).
390. See Kevin Outterson, New Business Models for Sustainable Antibiotics, in
CENTRE ON GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY WORKING GROUP PAPERS, WORKING GROUPS ON
ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE, PAPER 1 6 (Feb. 2014), available at http://www.chathamhouse.
org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Global%20Health/0214SustainableAntibio
tics.pdf [http://perma.cc/CU94-JPFB].
391. Cf. Sage & Hyman, supra note 24, at 823.
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in infectious diseases, have jointly worked to promote antibiotic stewardship
among medical professionals.392 Nevertheless, as noted above, as many
as fifty percent of the antibiotics prescribed in the United States continue
to be inappropriately used.393
2. Implementing the Framework for Antibiotic Resistance
The CDC has identified four goals for addressing the antibiotic resistance
problem, the first three of which implicate aspects of medical practice that
could be regulated under the framework proposed in this Article. First,
reducing misuse of antibiotics is “[p]erhaps the single most important
action needed to greatly slow down the development and spread of
antibiotic-resistant infections.”394 Second, tracking infections with drugresistant bacteria provides the opportunity to learn more about such
infections, including whether there are particular risk factors for infection
that can be mitigated in the future.395 Third, preventing infections with
drug-resistant bacteria is critical because it reduces the need for antibiotic
use, thereby helping to slow the development of resistance, and limits the
spread of the drug-resistant bacteria themselves.396 Finally, new treatments
for bacterial infections are needed.397
Thus far, federal legal efforts have primarily focused on the fourth
goal—developing new antibiotics. For example, the Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007 included limited provisions
intended to encourage antibiotic innovation, and specifically provided that
the provisions did not “restrict, in any manner, the prescribing of
antibiotics by physicians.”398 The Food and Drug Administration Safety
and Innovation Act of 2012 included more extensive provisions—known
as the Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now (GAIN) provisions—to
encourage antibiotic development by providing certain drugs extended

392. See Carolyne Krupa, 26 Organizations Team Up To Fight Antibiotic
Resistance, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 26, 2012, http://www.amednews.com/article/20121126/
profession/311269933/6/ [http://perma.cc/UV9J-MCB9].
393. See CDC REPORT, supra note 361, at 11.
394. Id. at 31.
395. See id. at 39.
396. See id. at 32.
397. See id. at 44.
398. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85
§§ 1111–1114, 121 Stat. 823, 976.
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periods of marketing exclusivity and a fast-tracked FDA approval process.399
The framework proposed in this Article would support federal legal action
that moves beyond incentivizing antibiotic development, and focuses on
the CDC goals that implicate medical practice.
Federal regulation in these areas could be accomplished in three ways,
the first of which would be for Congress to enact new legislation to
directly regulate medical practice that contributes to resistance. Legislation
could prohibit practitioners from inappropriately prescribing or dispensing
antibiotics, similar to the provision prohibiting off-label use of HGH.400
Although a prohibition on inappropriately prescribing and dispensing
antibiotics may not perfectly align with the FDA-approved labeling if
there are medically appropriate uses that are not approved, such a prohibition
could be added to the FDCA and enforced by the FDA, which already has
experience enforcing the prohibition of HGH’s off-label use. There may
be evidentiary difficulties with enforcing a requirement that practitioners
refrain from inappropriate prescribing or dispensing of antibiotics. It may
be difficult for the government to obtain information about prescribing
and dispensing practices, and even if it has access to that information, it
may be difficult to demonstrate that a particular prescribing or dispensing
decision was inappropriate. For example, it may be difficult to prove an
antibiotic was prescribed for a viral, rather than a bacterial, condition.
Nevertheless, an explicit federal prohibition on inappropriate medical uses
may carry an expressive value, and would allow the federal government to
impose penalties in circumstances where it does possess the evidence to
determine a use was inappropriate.
In addition to prohibiting inappropriate prescribing and dispensing of
antibiotics, Congress could enact legislation to directly require that
practitioners federally report infections with antibiotic-resistant bacteria
and undertake actions to prevent the spread of resistant infections when
they are diagnosed. The CDC may be the appropriate agency to implement
and enforce such requirements because it already has a reporting system
in place and guidelines for preventing the spread of infections, albeit of a
voluntary nature.401
Laws restricting prescribing, requiring practitioner reporting, or mandating
practitioner actions to prevent the spread of infections could impose
criminal or civil penalties on practitioners who violate the laws, including

399. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-144 §§ 701–718, 126 Stat. 993, 1077–82.
400. 21 U.S.C. § 333(e) (2012).
401. See CDC REPORT, supra note 361, at 32; NNDSS, supra note 382.
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forfeiture of their state-issued licenses, similar to the CSA.402 While
imposing such penalties on medical practitioners may seem draconian,
serious penalties would underscore the grave public health stakes of antibiotic
resistance. Additionally, such penalties are already imposed on medical
practitioners who violate existing federal laws governing medical practice.403
Moreover, the enforcing agency could—and is likely to—exercise its
discretion not to take action or seek the harshest penalties if the facts of a
particular case warrant it.404
In addition to enacting legislation to directly regulate medical practice
that contributes to resistance, Congress could enact new legislation to
indirectly regulate such medical practice. For example, Congress might
enact a law to require that hospitals—rather than practitioners—put in
place measures to identify resistant infections and prevent their spread,
similar to what some states have already done.405 IDSA has proposed several
legislative changes that would indirectly control medical practice that
contributes to resistance. One proposal is to create a “Limited Population
Antibacterial Drug” approval pathway, which would explicitly authorize
the FDA to approve antibiotics based on small studies for narrow
indications and would require labels for such antibiotics to have a logo
and other information signaling to practitioners that the drug should be
used in a limited fashion.406 Such labeling would encourage practitioners to
appropriately prescribe the drugs, and may help to change standards of
care. IDSA has also suggested that Congress require health care settings
to establish antibiotic stewardship programs as a condition of participation
in Medicare and Medicaid.407
Finally, because passing new legislation is politically challenging—and
this may be particularly true for legislation that would regulate medical

402. See 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2012); United States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168, 190 (2d Cir.
2004).
403. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 333(e), 853 (2012).
404. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 824 (1985).
405. See supra notes 385–86 and accompanying text.
406. See INFECTIOUS DISEASES SOC’Y OF AM., LIMITED POPULATION ANTIBACTERIAL
DRUG (LPAD) APPROVAL MECHANISM, available at http://www.idsociety.org/uploadedFiles/
IDSA/News_and_Publications/IDSA_News_Releases/2012/LPAD%20one%20pager.pdf
[http://perma.cc/GA4H-PD2M].
407. See Infectious Diseases Soc’y of Am., Combating Antimicrobial Resistance:
Policy Recommendations To Save Lives, 52 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S397, S398
tbl.1 (2011).
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practice408—federal regulation of medical practice that contributes to
antibiotic resistance might be most likely to occur pursuant to agencies’
existing authority. IDSA has proposed that the FDA require REMS for
antibiotics to address resistance.409 Through its REMS authority, the FDA
could indirectly control medical practitioners by, for example, requiring
manufacturers to educate practitioners about appropriate prescribing
practices and infection prevention measures, or ensure that an antibiotic
only be dispensed when there is documentation that it has been appropriately
prescribed.410 Such documentation could be a form that requires the
prescriber to affirm that the prescription is appropriate, the patient being
prescribed the antibiotic has a condition consistent with a bacterial
infection, and the dose is sufficient but not excessive. The FDA is authorized
to require a REMS when it is necessary to ensure that the benefits of a
drug outweigh its risks, which are generally conceptualized as risks to the
patient taking the drug rather than general risks to the public.411 That is,
the risks that inappropriate antibiotic-prescribing and inadequate infection
prevention measures pose to the public by contributing to resistance may
not fit squarely within the statutory framework for requiring REMS. But
there is some precedent for the FDA to consider harms to third parties
when requiring REMS; for example, one of the goals of the REMS for
transmucosal immediate release fentanyl products is to “[prevent] accidental
exposure to children and others for whom [the drugs] are not prescribed.”412
CMS also might exercise its existing authority to indirectly regulate
Medicare- and Medicaid-funded medical practice that contributes to
resistance. CMS could incentivize appropriate prescribing through its
coverage decisions. Such an action might be particularly important in
408. See supra section II.B.2.
409. See Derrick Gingery, Antibiotics Need REMS for Public, Not Patient, Safety
Reasons, IDSA Says, THE PINK SHEET, Sept. 13, 2010, at 15.
410. See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(3) (2012). The FDA has not exercised its REMS
authority to prohibit off-label prescribing of drugs and this Article is not necessarily
proposing that the FDA restrict all off-label uses. To the extent that there are medically
appropriate uses of antibiotics that are not approved, appropriate use may be a broader
category than on-label use.
411. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355-1(a), (b) (2012).
412. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., TRANSMUCOSAL IMMEDIATE RELEASE FENTANYL
(TIRF) RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGY (REMS) 2 (2014), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationfor
PatientsandProviders/UCM289730.pdf. Transmucosal immediate release fentanyl products
are opioids that are intended to manage breakthrough pain in adults with cancer who
routinely take other opioids for pain management. These products come in a variety of
forms, including sublingual tablets and lozenges, that may increase the risk of accidental
exposure to children. See Transmucosal Immediate-Release Fentanyl (TIRF) Medicines,
FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm282110.htm [http://
perma.cc/S4CW-XLR9] (last updated Mar. 21, 2014).
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light of recent research suggesting that inappropriate antibiotic use is
widespread among Medicaid patients.413 CMS also has the authority to
mandate that hospitals meet requirements “necessary” for “the interest of
the health and safety of individuals who are furnished services in the
institution” as a condition of participation in Medicare and Medicaid.414
CMS could exercise this authority to require that participating hospitals
establish antibiotic-prescribing and infection-prevention policies. Although
the first provision in the Medicare statute prohibits federal interference
with medical practice, courts have generally rejected challenges to Medicare
requirements on the ground that they impermissibly interfere with medical
practice, and likewise, these requirements would likely be a permissible
exercise of CMS’s authority.415 In sum, medical practice that contributes
to antibiotic resistance is one appropriate target for federal action under
the framework proposed in this Article, and there are numerous mechanisms
through which federal oversight might be implemented.
V. CONCLUSION
Conventional wisdom holds that the federal government rightfully
regulates medical products, but the states should regulate medical practice.
Concerns about upending this division of labor have endured even in the
face of national public health disasters caused, at least in part, by medical
practice. But, as this Article demonstrates, the federal government is already
deeply entrenched in the regulation of medical practice, and possesses
constitutional powers to continue to expand its regulatory reach. This federal
role in medicine, however, is inconsistently and ineffectively defined, and
at times, obfuscated.
This Article proposes principled criteria, which are consistent with the
goals of federalism, for determining when a federal role is warranted.
Instead of assigning oversight to states or the federal government based
on whether an activity constitutes medical practice, Congress and federal
administrative agencies should exert federal authority over medical practice
that causes or contributes to a national public health problem that the states
cannot address. While this framework will be most helpful in circumstances
in which it is very clear these criteria are satisfied—or not satisfied—
413. See Pengxiang Li et al., Factors Associated with Antimicrobial Drug Use in
Medicaid Programs, 20 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE 829, 831 (2014).
414. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e)(9) (2012).
415. See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text.
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applying this framework to serious public health problems, such as antibiotic
resistance, which do clearly satisfy the criteria will expand the options for
addressing those problems through federal law. Federally regulating
medical practice, by itself, will not solve public health problems, but Congress
and federal administrative agencies ought to consider all available regulatory
options that are constitutionally-authorized and, consistent with federalism
values, are ones for which the federal regulation may be advantageous.
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